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SUMMARY 
The main motivation of this thesis is to contribute to the literature and deepen our understanding 
of economic growth in a wide variety of countries. Explaining the course of economic growth 
and determine factors that might affect it, have been for a long time, and continue to be, one of 
the most important topics of economic literature. This thesis provides a survey and synthesis of 
econometric tools that have been employed to study economic growth. While these tools range 
across a variety of statistical methods, they are united in the common goals of first, contributing 
to our understanding of the empirical work on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
economies. Second, the study quantifies the empirical relationship between Output FDI, 
institutions, efficiency and productivity and a wide array of factors using data over the last 
41years. The first chapter is the introduction; the second chapter is an overview of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The empirical analysis of the research can be categorized into three main chapters. In the 
first chapter (Chapter 3), Complementarity versus Substitutability: FDI and Growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries are investigated to examine the degree of complementarity between FDI and 
domestic capital and the level of absorptive capacity of the host countries. In the second chapter 
(Chapter 4), Output and Institutions are investigated to examine whether institutional development 
is a determinant of output per worker and productivity growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The last 
chapter of empirical analysis (Chapter 5), The Role of Political and Economic Institutions on 
National efficiency: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, examines the role political and 
economic institutions play in promoting national efficiency and thus economic development. And 
Chapter 6 concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 01 
INTRODUCTION 
          The main motivation of this thesis is to contribute to the literature and deepen our 
understanding of economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries. Explaining the 
determinants and the sources of economic growth has been for a long time, and continues to be, 
one of the most important fields in the literature. The present thesis analyses and examines 
growth related issues from various aspects emphasising in particular, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and Institutions in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA). 
          Apart from the relationship between Output and Institutions, the role of trade openness and 
human capital on growth in developing countries continues to be of considerable theoretical and 
empirical interest both for researchers and policy makers.  A large number of studies have found 
a positive link between output, institutions, trade and human capital (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; 
Barro and Sala-i- Martin, 1995; Islam, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Collier & Gunning and 
Ramirez, 2002; Hall and Crowley 2010; Acemoglu Gallego and Robinson, 2014; Christopolous 
and McAdam, 2015). An important ongoing concern has been why has SSA countries grow 
slowly and (or) why per capita income remains far below, the level of other countries in the 
world. This thesis attempts to fill a gap in the literature by providing econometric evidence on 
these key issues exploring, economic performance of 32 SSA countries from different conceptual 
angles over the period of 1970-2010.1 
                                                          
1 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cote d’voire, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra-Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
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          The literature on the FDI-growth nexus is vast for both developed and developing countries. 
The basis of the empirical work on this link focuses on neoclassical and endogenous growth 
models. It is argued that FDI is an important source of capital deepening, which complements 
domestic investment, creates new jobs and transfers advanced technology. The diffusion of 
technological spillovers improves total factor productivity (TFP) and efficiency in less developed 
countries, which can be a crucial engine of economic growth. The positive effect of FDI on 
economic performance is often said to depend on the absorptive capacity of the host country 
(Betstrom et al., 1994; de Mello, 1997; Borenztein et al., 1998; Easterly and Levine, 2002), 
which is represented by the level of human capital, trade openness, institutional quality, and 
infrastructure development. Apart from data insufficiency and methodological flaws, the negative 
relationship found in some studies (Lipsey, 2000: Middendof, 2006) is an unexplored issue. Early 
cross country studies failed to take into account the continuously changing differences in 
technology, production and socioeconomic environment, and it have been only recently that 
empirical studies have made use of panel data to correct the above2. The key research question of 
the first empirical chapter is:- 
To examine the degree of complementarity and substitution between FDI and Domestic Capital 
and its implication for economic growth in SSA 
          The thesis considers institutional heterogeneity to be an explanation for why countries 
grow or stagnate. This is in line with recent emphasis on the role of institutions in economic 
growth3; weak institutions seem to be responsible for several economic problems in Sub-Saharan 
African countries. It is argued that, poor institutional quality is associated with lower investment, 
                                                          
2See Bende-Nabende& Ford (1998), Nair-Reichert &Weinhold (2001), Choe (2003). 
3See Aghion, Alesina &Trebbi (2008), Rodrik, Subramanian &Trebbi (2004), Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) 
and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer &Vishey (1998). 
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slower productivity growth, and thus lower per capita income. The standard growth models 
posited that, differences in output per capita can be attributed to differences in physical capital, 
human capital, and total factor productivity (TFP).  The quality of the institutional framework in 
determining output per capita is a relatively new aspect in the ongoing puzzle of growth 
determinants.  Hall and Jones (1999), Parente and Prescott (2000), Easterly and Levine (2002) 
and Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2014) argued that the observed differences in 
output per capita can be partially explained by the role of institutions. This study draws upon 
Solow (1956) growth model and the subsequent empirical modifications of Mankiw et al. (1992) 
and Barro and Salai-Martin (1995) but with focus on the role of institutions (Corruption, 
Government effectiveness, Political stability, Rule of law and Regulatory quality) in explaining 
differences in productivity across countries. This extension is important for two reasons; first, we 
analyse the dual character of institutions within a growth model framework, which has been 
previously neglected for SSA countries. Second, the empirics of long-run economic growth have 
been based on a cross section regression framework using average data for long periods. This 
method has limitations as it suffers from the problem of endogeneity. The study employs a panel 
data approach and the instrumental techniques to overcome these limitations. The key research 
question of the second empirical chapter is:  
To examine whether institutions are determinant of Output per worker and productivity growth in 
SSA 
          Many analysts believe that trade liberalization and better political and economic 
institutions will increase national efficiency and thus promote economic growth (Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991; Frankel & Romer, 1999; Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000). Traditional Growth 
empirics have demonstrated that economic institutions (Trade openness, FDI, Government Size, 
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Sound money, Regulations, etc.), are the major source of economic growth across countries 
(Rodrik 2007). These institutions have decisive influence on investments in physical and human 
capital, infrastructure, technology and thus national efficiency. Trade openness is often 
considered as a way to increase economic growth. Trade openness may also serve as a conduit for 
technology and knowledge transfers. Contacts with trade partners or competitors may generate 
knowledge spillovers into the rest of the economy, for instance, ideas for product differentiation 
or production design improvements. This leads to the accumulation of knowledge capital 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Xiaolan Fu, 2006). Again, economic factors play a role in the 
decision making factors of FDI, due to the fact that economic actors want a return to their 
investment and profit maximization is a major incentive for investors. However, the influence of 
political institutions is a key determinant of FDI destinations. In a country with a high level of 
corruption, high political unrest or instability, non-adherence to rule of law, has more risk and 
uncertainty, making it less attractive for investors. This is especially important for the present 
study on SSA countries that are largely characterized by an unstable political environment and 
incessant strikes that reduce national efficiency. There is little evidence to suggest that efforts to 
increase either physical or human capital levels in developing countries, especially in Africa, 
have been successful in generating growth. Easterly (2001), documents how Sub-Saharan African 
countries had larger increases in schooling than any other region since 1960. Yet these countries 
remained mired in poverty while Asian ‘tigers’ like South Korea and Taiwan had smaller 
increases in education levels but flourished economically. However, recent evidence (Hall, Sobel, 
and Crowley (2010), Acemoglu, Gallego and  Robinson (2014) shows, that investment in 
physical and human capital can lead to output growth only in countries with good institutions. In 
countries with bad institutions, increases in capital lead to negative growths because additions to 
capital stock tend to be employed in other socially unproductive activities. The econometric 
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analysis from this study shows that political institutions (Corruption, Government effectiveness, 
Political stability, Rule of law, and Regulatory quality), fundamentally matters for enhancing 
efficiency and thus economic development of SSA.  Therefore, institutions are the fundamental 
cause of long-run development, working not only through physical capital and TFP but also 
through human capital (North, 1990; Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatan, 1999; Meon & Sekkat, 
2008). The key research question of chapter 3 is: 
To examine the Role Political and Economic institutions play in promoting national efficiency 
and thus economic development in SSA countries. 
          The first chapter will be the introduction, while the second chapter gives an overview of 
Sub-Saharan Africa Countries; the empirical analysis of the research can be categorized into three 
main chapters. In the first empirical chapter (chapter 3), Complementarity versus Substitutability: 
FDI and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is investigated to examine the degree of complementarity 
or Substitutability  between FDI and domestic capital and the level of absorptive capacity of the 
host countries. We started with a discussion on the neoclassical growth model, Solow growth 
model and the Endogenous growth model as far as FDI is concerned in achieving long-run 
growth. The theoretical approach adopted in this study is the Endogenous growth model. We then 
apply the panel data techniques with annual data for 32 SSA countries.  In the second chapter 
empirical (chapter 4), Output and Institutions are investigated to examine whether institutional 
development is a determinant of output per worker and productivity growth in these countries. 
We started with the survey of key literature on Output and Institutions. The theoretical approach 
adopted in this study is the structural model of output per worker augmented with Human capital 
and Institution. The estimation is performed using the panel data techniques with annual data for 
32 Sub-Saharan Africa countries. To complement the analysis and provide a robustness check, 
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we introduce the instrumental techniques to control for endogeneity. The last chapter of empirical 
analysis (chapter 5), The Role of Political and Economic Institutions on National efficiency: 
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), examines the role political and economic institutions 
play in promoting national efficiency and thus economic development. We started with a survey 
of key literature on political and economic institutions. The model adopted in the study is the 
stochastic frontier model. The econometric estimation is performed using stochastic frontier 
analysis. And chapter 6 concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 02 
Overview of Sub-Saharan Africa Countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa is geographically, the area of the continent of Africa that lies South of Sahara 
Desert. Politically, it consists of all African countries that are fully or partially located south of 
the Sahara (excluding Sudan), even though Sudan sits in the Eastern portion of the Sahara desert. 
(See Figure 2:1). SSA comprises 49 of Africa’s 54 countries4. Therefore, it refers to all Africa 
except the five predominantly Arab states of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and 
Tunisia). In terms of population; SSA is the most populous regional economic community in 
Africa with a population estimated at 845 million in 2010, which grows at a rate of 2.67% per 
annum. Nigeria is the most populous country with a population estimated at 162 million (19.19% 
of the region). It is followed by Congo whose population is estimated at 70.9 million (8.39%). 
The least populated country of SSA is Seychelles which has a population estimated at 0.088 
million (1.04%). (See Appendix, Table 2: 1).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4  Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central Africa Republic; Comoros; Cape Verde; Chad; 
Cote d’ Voire; Congo; Democratic Republic of Congo; Djibouti; Ethiopia; Equatorial, Eritrea,  Guinea; Gabon; Gambia; 
Ghana; Guinea Bissau; Guinea; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi;  Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; Sao Tome and Principe; Seychelles; Somalia;  South Africa; 
Swaziland; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; Zaire; Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 2.1:   
 
Regarding the structure of the regional economy, agriculture still remains the backbone of the 
economy of SSA. From UNCTAD (2010), statistics the primary sector which involves mainly 
agricultural activity accounted for 40% of the GDP of the region, whilst the secondary and 
tertiary sectors accounted for 25% and 35% respectively. The Sub-Saharan economy is 
essentially grounded in four pillars; (a) Oil and mining sector with limited local content, (b) 
Agriculture and agro-allied business sector below potential. (c) Under-developed manufacturing 
and services sector. (d) Large and dynamic, informal sector. 
       Despite some success stories in 1960s and early 1970s, Africa is poor and getting poorer. On 
average, real per capita GDP did not grow in Africa over the 1965-1990 period, while, in East 
Asia and the pacific, per capita GDP growth was over five percent and Latin America grew at 
almost two percent per year (Easterly and Levine, 1997).  The average country in SSA is poorer 
than the average low-income country, indeed the average growth rate has been negative since 
12 
 
1965 and there is approximately a 35-fold difference between the per-capita income level of such 
a country and US (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). The analytical work on this poor 
performance has been hinged on scant constraints on executive power and long term democratic 
stability is under threat (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), poor economic and social indicators such as 
low economic growth, high inflation, and high infant mortality (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and 
weak governance and institutions and high level of corruption (Ali et al., 2010; Jakobsen, De 
Soysa, and Jakobsen, (2013).  Against this background of poor performance, there are some SSA 
countries that have performed well, even better than some developed countries. Appendix Table 
2.2 attempt to provide some insight into individual country performances by showing SSA in 
comparative perspective, it is evident Southern part of Africa (e.g. Botswana Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Swaziland) have performed well than West Africa (e.g. Benin, Burkina-Faso, 
Coted’voire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo) and Eastern Africa countries (e.g. 
Burundi, Comoros, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Again the life 
expectancy of these countries is better than other countries in the region. The performance of the 
Southern-part of this economy is worthy of mention. First, a number of these economies have 
adopted open trade and have out-performed the rest of Africa by a wide margin, these have been 
linked to their success in export processing industries, especially sugar, textiles and apparel. This 
is consistent with the findings in Sachs and Warner, (1997). Second, it is true that diamonds, 
uranium and agricultural exports have been important for the growth of these countries, for 
instance, Namibia is among the top twenty mining countries in the world, with diamonds and 
uranium being the leading commodities (UNCTAD, 2010). Again, diamonds have been 
important for growth in Botswana, and currently account for around 40percent of the country’s 
output5 and also the study by Henry, Kneller and Milner (2009), on 57 developing countries for 
                                                          
5 See Acemoglu 2001. 
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the period 1970-1998,  finds Mauritius among the 10 most efficient countries in the sample in 
1995. Yet, in many other countries in the region (Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone), natural 
resource abundance appears to be a curse rather than a blessing6. There is almost complete 
consensus that the southern part of SSA has achieved rapid growth because it managed to adopt 
good policies and there were no civil wars or intense infighting to control the revenues from their 
natural resources. The basic system of law and contract worked reasonably well, the government 
sustained the minimal public service structure that it inherited from the British and developed it 
into a meritocratic, relatively non-corrupt and efficient bureaucracy. 
Table 2.3: Economic Indicators: GDP per capita, (PPP), US Dollars 2014. 
  South Asia Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa 
1 Afghanistan 1,946.2 Brazil 15,153.31 Benin 1,873.76 
2 Bangladesh 3385.50 Mexico 17,925.11 Malawi 781.36 
3 Bhutan 7,656.96 Colombia 13,458.84 Burundi 912.49 
4 India 5,777.02 Argentina  22,101.30 Cameroon 2,981.95 
5 Laos 4,998.56 Bolivia 6,222.43 CAR 608.47 
6 Nepal 2,380.67 Venezuela 17,917.17 Comoros 1,673.71 
7 Srilanka 10,355.2 Chile 23,165.11 Cote d’voire 2,902.36 
 8 Vietnam 5621.41 Guatemala 7,476.93 Ethiopia 1,532.54 
9 Pakistan 4746.41 Ecuador 11,352.41 Gambia 1,744.53 
10 Indonesia 10, 156.71 Costa-Rica 14,914.40 Ghana 4,172.68 
11 Malaysia 24,520.78 Dominican Republic 12,803.27 Guinea Bissau 1,439.88 
12 Cambodia 3281.57 Honduras 4712.71 Kenya 3,138.11 
13  Thailand 14,442.64 Paraguay 8,385.54 Lesotho 2,925.12 
14   Nicaragua 4,797.02 Mozambique 1,123.29 
15   Elsavado 8,014.18 Mauritania 3,379.21 
16     Nigeria 6,081.67 
17     Senegal 2,316.30 
Source:  World Economic Outlook (IMF), 2015 
                                                          
6 See e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995 
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Table 2.3 shows per capita income between these three regions (South Asia, Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa). In per capita terms, the contrast in economic performance between these 
three regions is even greater. 
In the 1960’s South Asians were on the average much poorer than the Africans, but by 2005 they 
were almost two and half times richer (World Bank, 2009a). Higher per capita in South east Asia 
has entailed substantial reductions in poverty. The proportion of the regional population living on 
one US dollar per day (calculated at Purchasing Power Parity) fell by more than two-thirds 
between 1980 and 2003 (World Bank, 2009b). In contrast, poverty levels have remained high and 
rising. It is interesting to note that the high growth of per capita income of these countries was 
due entirely to higher capital accumulation and human capital (Loayza, Fajnzlber, and Calderon, 
2005). The poor economic performance of Sub-Saharan economies compared with performance 
in other regions (Latin America and South Asia), it’s frustrating and contradicted the 
explanations offered by the growth literature. This present study will offer explanation for slow 
growth in Sub-Saharan African countries with the newly assembled data set. 
        In last the decade all the countries in SSA have faced problems in their macroeconomic 
environments that had a significant impact on manufacturing sector performance. They had all 
adopted import substitution development policies from independence through the late 1970s. In 
the mid to late 1980s, they had all introduced “structural adjustment” programs with the support 
of the World Bank and other aid organizations, with emphasis on macroeconomic reforms, trade 
liberalization and privatization7. With an increasing pace of globalization that resulted partly 
from liberalization of trade and exchange rate regimes, most of these economies have resulted to 
different measures to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), which is an important element in 
                                                          
7 The scope and success of these programs varied (see Bigsten et al, 1999a, 199b). 
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solving the problem of scarce local capital and low productivity. However, it was only in the 
1990s that many SSA countries actively began to persuade foreign investors to invest their 
money and expertise in their countries. Foreign investment flows were very small relative to 
other developing countries, even where a political climate was favourable, partly because of the 
mismatch between development goals of the host countries and the goal of the foreign investors. 
Figure 2.2: 
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC Data Base, 2012 (www.unctad.org/Fdistatistics) 
The FDI as percentage of GDP (see Figure 2.2) show, Africa has never been major recipients of 
FDI flows and lag behind other regions of the world. After reaching a low on the average during 
the 1970s and 1980s, FDI as percentage of GDP improved continuously since the mid-1990s to 
reach an average level of 2.2 percent over 2000 demonstrating a more pronounced role for FDI 
on African continent.  By 1990, Africa’s share was a mere 1.37 percent compared to Asia’s 10.9 
percent and by 2009 while Africa’s share was just 5.27 percent, Asia received a whopping 27 
percent (see Figure 2.3), this stagnation is the result of poor economic and political uncertainty in 
Cote’ d’voire, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Niger, Zambia and a host of other African countries. 
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Figure 2.3:  
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC Data Base, 2012 (www.unctad.org/Fdistatistics) 
Sub-Saharan Africa can generate sustained, rapid growth into the future with the following four 
options. First is to revive manufacturing industries and put industrialization back on track, so as 
to replicate as much as possible the traditional routes to convergence. Second, they need to 
generate agriculture-led growth, based on diversification into non-traditional agricultural 
products. Third is the growth based on natural resources, in which many African countries are 
endowed and lastly, there is almost complete agreement that “poor business climate” and “poor 
institutions” has served as a deterrent to the rapid growth of Sub-Saharan Africa8. All these raise 
the costs of doing business with SSA for an investor interested in starting or expanding a 
manufacturing operation. 
  
                                                          
8Gelb, Meyer, and Ramachandran (2014), for example, cites costs of power, transport, corruption, regulations, security, contract 
enforcement, and policy uncertainty, among other impediments. 
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Appendix: 
Table2.1: Sub-Saharan African Countries GDP Per-capita (USD) (2009-2011) 
Countries Population 2009 2010 2011 
Comoros 773,407 788 817 902 
Djibouti 740,528 N/A N/A N/A 
Ethiopia 88,013,491 418 350 359 
Kenya 40,046,566 842 808 850 
Seychelles 88,340 N/A N/A N/A 
Somalia 10,112,453 N/A N/A N/A 
Sudan 41,980,182 N/A N/A N/A 
Tanzania 41,892,895 547 547 553 
Uganda 33,398,682 472 506 477 
Chad 10,543,464 699 837 891 
WEST AFRICAN SUB REGION   
Benin 9,056,010 765 681 736 
Chad N/A 699 837 891 
Gambia 1,824,158 434 550 543 
Ghana 24,339,838 N/A N/A N/A 
Guinea 10,324,025 418 477 492 
Guinea Bissau 1,565,126 244 508 575 
Ivory Coast 21,058,798 1,071 1,042 1,062 
Liberia 3,685,076 210 261 297 
Mali 13,796,254 641 614 668 
Mauritania 1,294,104 1,044 1,140 1,190 
Nigeria 162,217,341 N/A N/A N/A 
Senegal 14,086,163 984 981 1,075 
Sierra Leone  5,245,695 342 325 366 
Togo 6,019,877 408 459 505 
Burkina Faso 16,241,811 452 609 663 
Niger 16,878,270 375 370 399 
CENTRAL AFRICA SUB REGION   
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Angola 13,068,161 N/A N/A N/A 
Burundi 9,863,117 174 245 279 
Cameron 19,294,149 1,095 1,100 1,230 
Central Africa rep 4,844,927 446 428 456 
Congo 70,916,439 300 185 215 
Rwanda 11,055,976 512 557 605 
Congo Brazzaville 4,125,916 N/A N/A N/A 
SOUTH AFRICA SUB REGION   
Botswana 2,029,876 N/A N/A N/A 
Lesotho 1,919,552 N/A N/A N/A 
Madagascar 20,653,556 432 410 458 
Malawi 15,447,500 352 343 350 
Mauritius 1,284,264 1,044 1,140 1,290 
Mozambique 22,061,450 456 439 582 
Namibia 2,128,470 N/A N/A N/A 
Swaziland 1,354,051 N/A N/A N/A 
Zambia 12,056,923 1,022 1,221 1,413 
Zimbabwe 11,651,858 303 591 741 
Equatorial Genuine 650,702 N/A N/A N/A 
Eritrea 5,792,984 328 397 475 
Sao Tome & Principle    212,679 N/A N/A N/A 
South Africa 49,109,107 N/A N/A N/A 
Total  855,513,832 18,317 19,775 21,588 
Sources: UNCTAD 2012 
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Table 2.2Sub-Saharan African Countries in Comparative Perspective (1970-2010) 
Countries GDP  
per capita 
GDP growth 
per capita 
Life expectancy at 
Birth                                
Benin 331.59 0.67 49 
Botswana 2229.55 6.24 57 
Burkina Faso                              186.85 1.61 48 
Burundi 153.00  0.38 46 
Cameroon 629.81 1.08  51              
Central African Republic         284.36 -0.86  46 
Comoros 384.65    - 55 
Cote’ d’voire 736.25 -0.70 51 
Ethiopia    140.56 1.88 48 
Gambia    593.29 0.72 51 
Ghana          256.10 0.65 56 
Guinea-Bissau                           186.66 0.13 43 
Kenya   416.26 1.05 56                                                                       
Lesotho 330.39 2.72 52 
Madagascar 296.25 -1.22 54 
Malawi      148.15 1.11 46 
Mali    206.83 1.36 43 
Mauritania   530.26   0.28 54 
Mauritius 2782.74   3.52 69 
Mozambique 224.46 2.42 44  
Namibia      2186.44  0.68 58      
Niger   206.60 -1.13 44 
Nigeria 386.31  1.8 46 
Rwanda     243.62 1.91 43 
Senegal   506.49 0.22  51 
Seychelles   5503.27 3.31  64                                
Sierra-Leone                             201.01 0.32 41                                    
South Africa                             3379.86 0.57 56 
Togo     282.58 -0.14 51 
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Swaziland 1175.41 2.99 53      
Zambia   421.73 -0.58 48 
Zimbabwe     487.8 -0.50 54 
SOURCE: World Bank, Development indicators. 
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CHAPTER 03 
Complementarity versus Substitutability: FDI and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
3.1: Introduction 
Capital is a vital ingredient for economic growth, but since most nations cannot meet their total 
capital requirements from natural resources alone, they turn to foreign investors to supply capital. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) are two of the most 
common routes for overseas investors to invest in an economy. FDI is the investment by foreign 
investors directly in the productive assets of another nation while FPI is investment in financial 
assets such as stocks and bonds of entities located in another country.9 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) can undertake FDI between building its own establishment 
(Greenfield investment) or to acquire an existing firm (cross-border M&As) (Nocke and Yeaple, 
2007). The two forms of investment are different in nature (Wang and Wong, 2009). Economic 
studies suggest that Greenfield FDI and M&As may have different economic consequences in the 
host country. Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) find that Greenfield manufacturing FDI does not 
contribute to U.S. within industry skill-upgrading. Liu and Zhou (2008) find that greenfield FDI 
in Chinese high-technology industry is associated with both intra-industry spillovers and M&As 
only exhibit inter-industry spillovers. Wang and Wong (2009) show that Greenfield FDI 
improves economic growth while M&As have negative effects on the host country’s economic 
growth. 
                                                          
9 See OECD Benchmark Definition of foreign Direct Investment, Fourth edition 2008, for a comprehensive review. 
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However, FDI is obviously the route preferred by most nations for attracting foreign investments, 
since it is more stable than FPI and signals long-lasting commitment to an economy. Again, FDI 
investors typically take controlling positions in the domestic firms or joint ventures, and are 
actively involved in their management.10  FPI investors, on the other hand, are generally passive 
investors who are actively involved in the daily operations and strategic plans of domestic 
companies. 
3.2: Impacts of FDI on Economic Growth in the Host Country 
The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in stimulating economic growth is one of the most 
controversial issues in the literature on development economics. In a standard Solow- type 
growth model, FDI enables host countries to achieve investment that exceeds their own domestic 
saving and thus increases capital formation. The basic shortcomings of conventional neo-classical 
Growth models, as far as FDI is concerned, is that long-run growth can only result from 
technological progress and (or) labour force growth, which are both considered to be exogenous. 
FDI would only affect output growth in the short-run while in the long-run, under the 
conventional assumption of diminishing returns to capital, the recipient economy would converge 
to its steady state, leaving no permanent impact on output growth (de Mello 1996, 1997, 1999), 
Hanson (2001), Carkovic and Levine (2003), Gorg and Greenway (2004). 
Another strand of the growth literature Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), Alfaro et al.,(2004), Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2005) and Ozturk 
                                                          
10 IMF guidelines consider an investment to be a foreign direct investment if it accounts for at least 10 percent of of 
the foreign firms voting stock of shares. However, many countries set a higher threshold because 10 percent is 
often not enough to establish effective management control of a company or demonstrate an investor’s lasting 
interest. 
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(2007). Endogenise the rate of technical change to emphasize the role of knowledge spillovers 
generated from FDI and R&D. Under this consideration, FDI can be a substantial conduit for the 
transmission of new ideas, technological know-how and advanced managerial practices. More 
recent empirical studies Islam (1995), Bende-Nabende& ford (1998),Choe(2003),  Li and Liu, 
(2005), Jude &Levieuge (2013) and Bashir et al.,(2014)make use of panel data to correct for 
continuously evolving country-specific differences in technology and educational attainment, 
thus eliminating many of the difficulties encountered in cross-country estimations (e.g., 
Chowdhury &Mavrotas (2005); Yousaf et al.,(2008); Olayiwola & Okodua (2013)). 
For FDI related spillovers to be an effective engine of growth for the domestic economy, 
MNCs needs to maintain a certain level of embeddedness with the local economy (Phelps et al., 
2003 a Wren, 2006; Bashir et al, (2014)), in other words, embeddedness is required in order for 
MNCs to build up networks with local firms and thus making possible for the diffusion of 
knowledge spillovers.11 The present study seeks to overcome the data problem of the existing 
literature using a newly assembled data set, which assess the effects of FDI in 32 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, henceforth (SSA), within an endogenous growth framework 
The diffusion of technologies had a major role in the spillover process from foreign firms 
with superior knowledge to that of domestic firms (Borensztein et al., 1998; Benhabib and 
Spiegel 1994; Jude and Levieuge 2013) and therefore, plays a central role in the technological 
and economic progress of developing countries (Jovanovic& Rob, 1989, Borensztein et al., 1998). 
The primary creation of knowledge is thereby mostly in the hands of foreign activity, but local 
                                                          
11 The notion of embeddedness implies that inward FDI in developing countries should carry certain 
characteristics that are highly correlated with high value added activities. The FDI-growth nexus is better 
promoted if MNCs are export-oriented; invest in R&D and tangible assets etc. Certainly, integration 
between local firms and MNCs can be achieved more effectively if local economy has the appropriate 
institutional framework as well as there is enough productive capacity to absorb knowledge spillovers from 
FDI. 
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economy needs to prove they have sufficient ability to imitate and absorbFDI induced 
technological advancements.  
Given that FDI is directly associated with technological diffusion (Grossman and Helpman, 
1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1994; Phelps, 1996), growth process in developing countries can 
be partly explained by a “catch-up” process. As already implied above, the rate of economic 
growth of a backward country depends on its ability to implement technologies that are already in 
use in leading countries (Borensztein et al., 1995). On this basis, FDI is considered to be a major 
channel of the catch-up process between backward and leading countries. 
 The neo-classical Solow growth model predicts that the elasticity of output with respect to 
capital should be equal to the share of capital in total output, nevertheless cross-sectional 
estimates point out a much higher value. Recently, those high estimates have been interpreted as 
evidence of the importance of endogenous growth (Romer,1990), and explained on the grounds 
that capital should be understood in a broad sense as it incorporates additional inputs (for 
instance human capital and R&D spending) that eliminate the assumption of diminishing returns 
(Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). 12 In other words, high capital elasticities incorporate 
externalities from those additional inputs (Benhabib and Jovanovic, 1991; Benhabib and Spiegel, 
1994). On that basis, FDI-related externalities can be shown to produce the higher capital 
elasticity in growth accounting equations. 
The subject of FDI related spillovers in growth is of vital importance for the developing 
world, but the empirical evidence is rare-at least- within an African context. Additionally, some 
new theoretical insights are also valuable for empirical analysis of the issue are needed as well as 
                                                          
12 This also refers to as embodied technical change in capital inputs. 
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for a better understanding of the link between FDI and economic growth. The existing FDI 
literature for African economies (Odozi, 1995; Oyinlola, 1995; Adelegan, 2000; Asiedu, 2001; 
Akinlo, 2004; and Ayanwale, 2007) mainly relies on cross-sectional evidence without addressing 
time variation in the data. Our study overcomes this gap with a cross-section time series data set 
of 32 countries over a period 41 years. 
According to the endogenous growth model, investment in physical and human capital, 
greater export orientation and faster population growth should lead to permanent changes in 
economic growth. The growth process is also subject to changes in the policy spectrum, such as 
government consumption, infrastructural development and domestic capital.13FDI is expected to 
impact on economic growth through two channels: First, it increases the available capital stock 
and thus improves the degree of capital deepening in the recipient country (de Mello 1999; 
Dunning 1993; Blomstrom et al., 1996; Borensztein et al., 1998). Second, the transfer of modern 
technology and Know-how is another potential benefit associated with the inflow of FDI into an 
economy. FDI is incorporated by large transnational corporations which are some of the most 
technologically advanced firms and carry out most of the research and development activity 
globally (Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998). The immediate benefit is ascertainable on the 
level of individual enterprises but the existence of spillover effects “suggests that FDI affects 
growth endogenously through increasing returns generated in interaction between local firms and 
foreign affiliate” (Wang and Blomstom, 1992). 
                                                          
13 In addition the quality of institutions in a country influences its ability to ensure economic growth and improve the 
quality the quality of life of its population. Therefore the growth process of a country will depend on several 
institutional indicators such as property rights, governance, political stability, legal systems and control of corruption 
(see, Hall and Jones 1999, and Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
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The above considerations suggest that FDI gains are conditional to the degree of 
complementarity between FDI and domestic production (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996). The 
two competing hypotheses are whether FDI crowds out or in domestic investment.14Agosin and 
Mayer (2000) argued that FDI and domestic investment are likely to be complementary when the 
investment is in an undeveloped sector of the economy (due to technological factors or to the lack 
of knowledge of foreign markets). On the other hand, FDI is more likely to substitute for 
domestic investment when it takes place in sectors, where there exist plenty of domestic firms. 
Again Yousaf et al., (2008), find a positive relationship of FDI with imports and exports in the 
long-run economic growth in Pakistan and argued that there is complementarity between foreign 
trade and FDI. 
 We aim to contribute to the existing literature in three dimensions.  Firstly, the study uses 
a larger cross country (32 countries) sample over a longer time period (1970-2010). Second, 
interactions of FDI with human capital, infrastructure and trade openness are introduced to 
examine whether FDI affects growth by itself or through the interaction term. Finally, the study 
focused on the additional question of whether the impact of FDI varies between economies, 
which are mineral-rich versus those who are not, since many countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region might attract FDI flows in the primary sector, due to the abundance of mineral and natural 
resources. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Tang et al., (2008) find FDI to be complementary to domestic investment contributing to the shortage of domestic 
capital leading to beneficiaries’ results for economic growth in China. 
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The main focus of this chapter is to: 
• Examine the degree of complementarity and substitution between FDI and Domestic capital. 
For FDI to affect growth positively, it may be argued that it requires some degree of 
complementarity with domestic investment. 
• Examine the absorptive capacity of the SSA countries. Foreign direct investment contributes 
to economic growth only when a sufficient absorptive capacity of the advanced technologies 
is available in the host economy. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows:  Section 2 presents the analytical framework. 
Section 3 discusses the data set used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 outlines the 
methodology upon which the study is based and the results of the empirical analysis.  The last 
section contains the concluding remarks. 
3.2: Theoretical Underpinnings 
 We depart from a growth accounting approach,15 and then we augment the aggregate production 
function with ancillary variables (i.e. Trade measure, economic stability, government size, 
infrastructure facilities, institutional dummies,). An aggregate production function of two inputs 
is written as:  
( , )Y Af H L=                                                                    (3.1) 
Where Y  is the output, A is an efficiency parameter, L  and H  is the overall total capital 
endowment in the recipient economy.  
Therefore,                                           ,( )D FH K K=                                                                     (3.2) 
                                                          
15 See Solow (1957) and Denison (1962, 1967). 
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 We can think the overall total capital endowment as domestic ( DK ) or foreign-owned ( FK ), as a 
consequence of FDI. FDI affect's growth directly, by increasing the stock of physical in the 
recipient economy, as FK is accumulated, and indirectly, by inducing human capital development 
and promoting technological upgrading. 
The specific Cobb-Douglas production function for, the recipient economy in per capita 
terms for each time period is given as 
                                        ( )y Af h=                                                                                  (3.3) 
                                      ( )d fh k k
α h=                                                                                  (3.4) 
We assume that 0α > which means, increases in FDI stocks yields positive externalities to the 
host economy. 
                                            0ifh > , then 
1 1
n
d fk k
αh<
                                                                    
(3.5) 
 From equation (3.5), foreign capital, crowds in domestic investment and complementarity exits 
between FDI and domestic Capital 
                                             0ifh < , then 
1
dk
h
> 1
fk
αh
                                                                    
(3.6) 
 From equation (3.6), foreign capital, crowds out domestic capital, decreasing growth 
The degree of complementarity or substitution between foreign capital and domestic 
investment is shown to affect output growth in theoretical models (given parameters α andh  in 
equation (3.5) and (3.6). Under complementarity, innovations embodied in foreign investment 
may create, rather than reduce, rents accruing to older technologies (Young, 1993). Also, if FDI 
contributes to faster growth, it is likely to require some degree of complementarity with domestic 
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investment rather than substitution, given that the existing factor endowments in the host country 
act as an FDI determinant. 
By combining equations (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain: 
(1 ) (1 )
d fy Ak k
h β αh β− −=                                                                        (3.7) 
 
Taking the logarithms and differentiating with respect to time equation (3.7) gives, 
                               
[ ](1 ) (1 ) fd
d
dkdkI dY I dA In
Y dt A dt k dt dt
β αh β= + − + −
                                        
(3.8) 
From equation (3.8), we can derive a general growth accounting equation as: 
[ ] [ ](1 ) (1 )y A dg g g gfh β αh β= + − + −                                                                                      (3.9) 
Where is yg  real per capita GDP growth, dg is the growth rate of the domestic capital stock and  
yg is the growth rate of the foreign-owned capital stock. Again, Ag denotes TFP growth. 
Equation (3.9) can be expanded to incorporate a set of control and policy variables that are 
generally included in growth models as potential determinants. These control variables include, 
government consumption (as a percentage of GDP) of the country, human capital, infrastructure, 
inflation trade openness, etc.  Grossman and Helpman (1990), and Rodrik (1992) have pointed 
out that trade can potentially create both growth-accelerating and growth-decelerating forces. 
Kowalski (2000) argues that inflation determines steadiness of the economy of the country. If the 
inflation rate is high, it could be an escalating problem for the economy. We expect a negative 
correlation of this variable with our dependent variable, in line with the literature. 
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3.3: Data 
3.3.1: General Description 
Data on GDP per capita and capital stock were taken from World Bank’s Development 
Indicators (WBDI). Data are expressed in constant 2000 USD. We capture absorptive capacity of 
Sub-Saharan African countries using capital stock measured as gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) as a percentage of GDP. Capital goods imports embody knowledge of foreign 
technology and production know-how; the greater these imports the greater the scope for direct 
absorption of foreign innovation by the importing firms and for spillovers of this knowledge to 
other firms (Henry, Kneller and Milner, 2009; Griffith et al., 2005). The major source of this 
capital stock is FDI. Policy makers believe that FDI is an important element in the growth 
process of developing economies (Bwayla, 2006). FDI data are taken from various issues of the 
World Bank, Development Indicators, International Monetary Fund and International Financial 
Statistics. Human capital is measured by mean years of schooling in the population aged 15 and 
over is taken from Barro and Lee (2000). Trade openness is the share of exports plus imports to 
GDP (WBDI and ADB databases). Inflation variable reflects the annual percentage of the cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such as yearly. The data were taken from World Bank Development 
Indicators. And Finally the Infrastructure variable measures the number of telephone lines per 
1000 population and the series is taken from World Bank Development Indicators. For the period 
1970-1979, series have missing values for most of SSA countries. Our complementary sources 
included the United Nations’ National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) and Statistical Bulletin of Central Bank of SSA countries.  The initial 
panel includes 48 Sub-Saharan African countries covering the period 1970-2010, data for the 
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period 1970-1979 are scarce for some of the countries and we decided to drop them to avoid 
issues of outliers that will bias our results. The final format of our annual data is an unbalanced 
panel of 32 countries for the period 1970-2010.  
3.3.2: Definition of Variables. 
Since the study is to examine the effect of FDI on economic growth of Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the variables that are important determinant of economic growth will be included in 
our model (see Appendix: Table 3.1), for the list of variables, description and data source. The 
dependent variable used is the GDP per capital growth, which is obtained as a ratio of real GDP 
to the population growth. The figures for this were constructed using World Development 
Indicators (WDI). This is following after de Mello (1996, 1997 and 1999), Borensztein et al., 
(1998) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). 
The independent variables included in the model are: 
Foreign direct investment: Foreign direct investment is represented by FDI net inflows as 
percentage of GDP and FDI inflow per worker. Previous studies have used use one or more of the 
above measures in order to determine the impact of FDI on economic growth. Ram and Zhang 
(2002) introduce three variations of the measure in their model, and find that they yield similar 
results. I introduce the variations of this variable, and find that they yield similar results. 
Domestic Capital: Proxy by investment (gross capital formation). Domestic capital is included in 
our model to determine the extent to which FDI complements domestic capital. Previous studies 
have shown that FDI will serve as an engine of growth if it complements domestic capital (de 
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Mello, 1999, and Borensztein et al., 1998). We have used Gross capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP. 
Manufacturing value added: Manufacturing value added as a percentage ratio of GDP is used as a 
proxy for learning by doing. Romer (1986), Stokey (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1990) 
emphasized that learning by doing can have a positive effect on growth during economic 
transition, as well as in the long-term. I have used this variable to determine the contribution of 
the manufacturing sector to the overall economy of Sub-Saharan African economy. 
Human Capital: In endogenous growth theory, human capital has been recognized as an essential 
determinant of economic growth. Mankiw et al. (1992), Akinlo (2004), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004), and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) have long stressed the importance of human capital to 
growth in both developed and developing countries. I have used the Secondary school enrolment 
as a proxy for human capital. 
Inflation: Inflation rate is included as a measure of overall economic stability of the country. 
Macroeconomic stability is one important determinant of economic growth. We expect an 
indirect relation between inflation and economic growth. In studies by Tobin (1965), Stockman 
(1981), Friedman (1977) and Jones and Manuelli (1995), the inflation rate was used as an 
indicator of macroeconomic stability. 
Infrastructure development: Good infrastructure facilitates production, reduces operating costs 
and thereby promotes FDI (Wheeler and Mody, 1992). Infrastructure increases the productivity 
of investments and therefore stimulates FDI flows. As is standard in the literature, I use the 
number of telephone lines per 1,000 populations to measure infrastructure development. 
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Openness: In the literature, the ratio of trade (imports, exports) to GDP is often used as a measure 
of openness of an economy (Asiedu, 2002; Ayanwale, 2007). This ratio is also often interpreted 
as a measure of trade restrictions. In the growth accounting literature exports have been 
considered as an explanatory variable. FDI inflows are expected to result in improved 
competitiveness of host country’s exports. As exports and investments may also generate foreign 
exchange that can be used to import capital goods.  We expect a direct relationship between this 
variable and economic growth.  
Government size: This is measured as the ratio of government consumption to GDP. It is 
expected to bear a direct relationship to economic growth. This is because a higher level of 
government consumption should translate into provision of more social capital that should 
encourage production and growth.   
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of included variables: Sample 32 Countries (1970-2010) 
Variable Observations Mean     Std. Deviation       Minimum Maximum 
GDP per capita 1312 3.83                3.90 0.0002 47.28 
Capital    1312 18.66                8.81                   2.0004                     76.69 
FDI        1312 5.42                8.28                   6.90е-07                           111.80 
MVA   1312 11.97               7.01                  0.3640                      62.82 
Human capital       1310 2.96               3.89                    0.0234                       30.12 
Inflation rate          1312 11.45             12.31                  0.0123                      83.32 
Infrastructure       1312 3.74               5.71                  0.0320                        31.22 
Trade   1312 0.73               0.50                 0.0028                        3.25
Government 1311 14.38                  7.21                   0.0093                           64.39        
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Author’s calculations 
Table 3.2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics using data averaged over 1970-2010.  
There are considerable cross-country variations in the data. For instance the mean per capita 
growth for the sample is 3.83% and the standard deviation is 3.90%.The mean FDI net inflows in 
percentage of GDP is 5.42% and standard deviation of 8.28% this represents a very low FDI 
inflows as percentage of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa economy. 
 Botswana and Nigeria enjoyed the maximum growth 7% and 7.1%, while Burundi, Burkina-
Faso and Comoros had the lowest average growth of 0.3%, 1.5% and 1.5% respectively over the 
period (see Tables, 3.4a and 3.4b) 
Table 3.3, shows the breakdown of Sub-Saharan African countries into mineral-rich and mineral-
poor. The definition of mineral-rich is taken from Nijkam (2008) and supplemented with data 
from Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2010). To confirm the authors’ classification, I construct a 
mineral-richness index defined as follows: 
exp min expmin
exp exp exp
fuel orts eral ortseralrichness
manufacturing orts agriculture orts food orts
+
=
+ +
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The index is greater than 1 when fuel and mineral exports exceed other exports, and less than or 
equal to one otherwise. I classify countries as mineral-rich if the index is greater than 1 and 
mineral-poor if the index is less than 1. Using averaged export data from 1970 to 2010, I find this 
classification to be generally the same as Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin’s in the instances where 
the exports data are available, and thus proceed with their classifications. Table 3.3 lists all the 
countries of my sample and their classification into the two groups  
Table 3.3 Classification of countries in Sub-Saharan African 
Mineral-Rich economies Mineral-poor economies 
Botswana                   
Cameroon                     
Niger 
Nigeria 
Benin                     
Burkina Faso 
Malawi 
Mali 
Central Africa Rep.           
Mauritania  
Lesotho                                                                                 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Zambia
Burundi               
Comoros                    
Cote d’voire 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Rwanda 
Namibia  Ethiopia Senegal 
  Gambia Seychelles 
  Ghana Swaziland 
  Guinea-Bissau Togo 
  Kenya Zimbabwe 
Source: Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2010) 
 
Table 3.4a  and 3.4b, shows the comparative analysis of FDI net inflows in percentage of GDP 
and Real GDP per capita growth in mineral-rich and mineral poor countries and growth seems to 
correlate positively with FDI, for all the countries. Table 3.4a shows that mineral rich countries 
have a higher growth rate than the mineral poor countries; one of the factors contributing to 
growth in many of these countries has been the continuous increased prices of commodities, 
particularly oil prices. 
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Table3.4a: FDI and Real GDP per capita Growth in Mineral Rich countries (1970-2010) 
Countries    FDI net inflows in % GDP             Real GDP growth 
Botswana 6.5     7.0 
Cameroon   4.4  3.1 
Central African Republic              3.0 3.2 
Lesotho 4.7 6.5 
Mauritania    3.7   6.3 
Namibia     2.2 4.8 
Niger            4.3 1.1 
Nigeria 4.2  7.1 
Sierra-Leone              4.4  5.7 
South Africa                     2.1 2.4 
Zambia 3.6 6.5 
Average 3.9 4.9 
SOURCE: UNCTAD, WDI, DATABASE 2011 
Appendix:  Figure 3.1 plots the real GDP growth among the 32 SSA countries. The picture looks 
a bit less gloomy when FDI performance is related to the size of the economy.  Sub-Saharan 
African economies are generally much smaller than those of other developing countries and 
would quite naturally attract less FDI. The seven  most dynamic countries identified as 
“frontrunners” in Africa by UNCTAD, 2011 are Botswana, Cote d’voire, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Seychelles, and Lesotho, have experienced the highest growth rates in the whole of 
Sub-Saharan African countries 
Figure 3.1, shows that mineral-rich countries have higher levels of Real GDP per capita. The 
modest growth of these countries is buoyed by new mineral exports- Diamond in Botswana, oil in 
Nigeria, iron ore in Sierra-Leone and Uranium and oil in Niger and a return to peace in cote 
d’voire. 
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Table 3.4b: FDI and Real GDP per capita Growth in Mineral Poor countries (1970-2010) 
Countries FDI net inflows in % GDP Real GDP growth 
Benin 2.3 4.0 
Burkina Faso  3.1 1.5 
Burundi 3.3 0.3 
Comoros 2.1 1.5 
Cote d’voire 3.0 3.5 
Ethiopia 4.8 3.4 
Gambia 2.7 5.3 
Ghana     3.4 3.3 
Guinea Bissau                                 4.6 2.5 
Kenya 2.7 1.8 
Madagascar 3.1 2.5 
Malawi 3.9 4.5 
Mali 4.0 3.8 
Mauritius 4.1 3.1 
Mozambique                                  5.3 4.4 
Rwanda 5.9 2.1 
Senegal 2.8 3.2 
Seychelles 5.7 6.5 
Swaziland 3.7 2.5 
Togo 4.2 4.0 
Zimbabwe   4.9 2.2 
Average 3.7 3.4 
Source: UNCTAD, WDI, DATABASE 2011 
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Trends in services trade, particularly tourism (an important driver of growth in mineral poor 
countries such as Kenya, Mauritius and Seychelles, have mirrored developments in these 
economies. The real GDP growth of 6.5% of Seychelles is not surprising. The country is one of 
the most developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and it’s known for its up market tourism and 
offshore financial centre. In recent years, to make the economy less dependent on tourism, 
Seychelles promoted the development of farming/fishing industries (UNCTAD, 2011). There 
have also been some policies actively designed to attract investment such as tax holidays, easing 
of import and customs controls, infrastructure investment and labour law reform. 
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3.4: Econometric Model and Estimation of Results. 
This section, present results from estimating an unbalanced panel of 41 years for the period 
(1970-2010). Initially we pool observations across countries and years and then we control for 
country fixed effects. This is the appropriate technique to control for unobserved country 
heterogeneity. Similarly, we can use ordinary least squares (OLS) including country and year 
dummies, the so called least squared dummy variables (LSDV). The impact of FDI on growth 
can be estimated in a panel using the following equation: 
, , , , ,y h k h f h w hg g g gζ y g ε= + + +                                                              (3.10) 
Where h  identifies the countries in the panel, and the remaining variables are the ones in 
equation (3.9), and ε is a white-noise disturbance term. If unobservable country-specific growth 
determinants are to be taken into account, the equation (3.10) can be estimated as follows: 
, , , , ,y h h k h f h w hg g g gξ ζ y g ε= + + + +                                                      (3.11)    
where hξ  is a time-invariant individual country-effect or country dummies (which avoid the 
requirement that countries in the panel should have a common concept).                           
The results obtained from the pooled OLS and fixed effects are presented in Table 3.5. The 
overall performance of the model is satisfactory with coefficients correctly signed and eight of 
the explanatory variables found to be statistically significant. We next include a dummy variable 
of mineral rich equal to 1 if a country is located in mineral-rich area and zero otherwise.  This 
variable tests whether mineral-rich countries in SSA receive more FDI due to abundant in 
mineral resources.  
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Table 3.5: FDI and Growth: Baseline Specification 
Variables POLS LSDV FE 
Capital (gk)      0.05*** 
(2.10) 
   0.09*** 
(4.99) 
0.04** 
(4.82) 
FDI (gFK)   0.05**      0.02*** 0.01* 
 (2.00) (2.00) (2.10) 
MVA      0.01***    0.1***     0.02*** 
 (3.65) (4.89) (2.00) 
Human Capital 0.02***  0.03***     0.05*** 
 (24.12)    (31.25) (8.98) 
Inflation rate       -0.008*** -0.01***   - 0.02*** 
 -(6.10) -(7.76) -(4.03) 
Infrastructure 0.09***    0.02***    0.08** 
 (2.44)  (6.08) (4.74) 
Openness(T) 0.03*      0.10*** 0.5* 
 (2.23)    (2.57) (2.10) 
Government Size 0.01*** 
   (5.66)                                
        0.07*** 
  (3.40) 
    0.04*** 
(3.88) 
Interaction terms    
FDI*Human cap   0.18* 
   (2.79) 
FDI*Infrastructure       -0.001*** 
                -(3.66) 
FDI*Trade       0.005** 
                 (2.62) 
FDI*Mineral-rich 0.23 0.12 0.34 
 (1.86) (1.76) (1.66) 
Year Dummies NO YES NO 
Country Dummies NO YES NO 
Diagnostic Test    
R-Square 0.56 0.41 0.57 
F-statistic 7.39 2.45 4.38 
No of Observations 1310 1280 1310 
Note: Robust t-statistics figure is shown in parenthesis, Significant at 1%*** ; 5%** and  10% * level of Significant 
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The estimated coefficient of economic growth indicates that, other things remaining constant, a 1 
percent increase in FDI would raise the GDP per capita growth of the SSA countries by 
0.02%and 0.01% for the LSDV and fixed effect method respectively. The estimated coefficient 
of domestic capital is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for LSDV and FE 
implying that the linkage between FDI and domestic investment is complementary. Therefore, 
FDI inflows augment and contribute to domestic capital formation to accelerate the development 
of the host countries.  
Manufacturing value added has a positive relationship with growth as expected. This result 
suggests the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the overall economy. Our result is 
consistent with the findings in Romer (1986), Stokey (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1990), 
who emphasized that learning by doing, can have a positive effect on economic growth. 
Government size has a positive and significant relationship with growth, suggesting that 
government expenditure encourages economic growth via public investments; in other words, 
there is a “crowding in” effect of government expenditure. In essence,  government expenditure 
initiatives are such that may lift long-run growth rates by increasing investment in physical 
capital, knowledge creation, human capital and research and development.  This is in line with 
the findings of Adelegan (2000), Ayanwale (2007) but in contrary with the submission of Akinlo 
(2004). 
Openness has a positive and significant relationship with economic growth. This is expected and 
is consistent with previous results such as those of Asiedu (2001).  Li and Liu (2004) and Flexner 
(2000) also report a positive relationship between trade and economic growth in China and 
Bolivia, respectively. This result stresses the importance of static gains from economies of scale 
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due to market expansion. Countries with more open trade policy have less market distortions, 
high level of efficiency and competition, which enhance the spillover effects of FDI 
(Balasubramanyam et al., 1996). 
Human capital variable had a positive and   significant relationship with growth. The implication 
of this result is that the differences in technological absorptive ability may explain the variation in 
growth effects of FDI across countries. The level of human capital determines the ability to adopt 
foreign technology. Thus, large endowments of human capital in SSA are assumed to induce 
higher growth rates. Our result is consistent with the findings of (Christopoulos and McAdam, 
2015) who argued that human capital may impact on growth through demonstration effects, 
complementarities and diffusion process induced by skills. Such effects can take place through 
openness and FDI, both of which affected human capital. 
Inflation variable used as a proxy for macroeconomic instability has a negative relationship with 
growth as expected. This suggests that an unstable macroeconomic environment discourages the 
growth (Borensztein et al., (1998) and Li and Liu (2004)).  Therefore, a lower inflation will pay 
off in terms of better long-run performance and higher per capita income. 
Infrastructure; Infrastructure increases the productivity of investments and therefore, stimulates 
FDI flows. (Wheeler and Moody, 1992; Wang, 2002) documents the evidence that a good 
infrastructure facility reduces operating costs and thereby promotes FDI. The infrastructure 
variables do provide the expected positive sign in Table 3.5.  The role of infrastructure in the 
economic growth of a country has been emphasized in both theoretical and empirical studies 
(Wang 2002, Ramiraz and Nazmi 2003, Rioja 2004) infrastructure facilities contribute to 
economic growth by improving amenities that enhance the living standards of the society. 
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Therefore, infrastructure is generally believed to be one of the essential factors for economic 
growth, especially roads, telecommunication services, electricity, water supply, etc. 
According to Borensztein et al., (1998), foreign direct investment contributes to economic growth 
only when a sufficient absorptive capacity of the advanced technologies is available in the host 
economy. The level of domestic human capital and its interaction with FDI, therefore, play an 
important role in the growth-enhancing effect of the latter. The strong synergism between FDI 
and human capital as a factor affecting economic growth is consistent with the idea that the 
advanced technology embodied in FDI can increase the host’s economic growth through its 
interaction with country’s absorptive capacity. 
To address the issue of absorptive capacity in the host country, in line with the second 
objective of this chapter, we include additional interaction terms to capture and separate out the 
synergistic effect between FDI and the level of human capital formation, the estimations 
presented in Table 5, control for among other factors, the level of human capital (represented by 
tertiary enrolment as a percentage of the GDP). The FDI-schooling (synergy) interaction variable 
is positive and statistically significant. The implication of this result is that the level of human 
capital and its interaction with FDI therefore play an important role in the growth-enhancing 
effect of the latter. The strong synergism between FDI and human capital as a factor affecting 
economic growth is consistent with the idea that the advanced technology embodied in FDI can 
increase the host’s economic growth through its interaction with the country’s absorptive 
capacity (see, Lucas, 1998; Borensztein et al., 1998). 
Our results for interaction of FDI and Infrastructure confront prior evidence that good 
infrastructure facilities production reduces operating costs and their by promotes FDI. The 
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interaction term of FDI with infrastructure do not provide the expected positive sign. Our finding 
more likely suggests the poor state of infrastructural facilities in SSA. Infrastructure development, 
in particular, the availability of telephones, is not very reliable in most of the SSA countries. 
Indeed, foreign firms in the extractive industries often located in remote areas, which typically 
lack access to basic amenities such as electricity and water. According to Collier and Gunning 
(1999) about 78% of firms in Nigeria use private generators because electricity supply is 
unreliable. More recently, a number of studies have suggested a potential role of advanced 
infrastructure, in particular, in attracting FDI (Reynolds et. al., 2004; Yol and Teng 2009). A 
country’s capacity for absorbing FDI depends highly on the infrastructure facilities in terms of a 
physical and regulatory framework available in the economy for foreign investments. Therefore, 
countries with advanced infrastructure absorb more FDIs than do countries with relatively low-
level infrastructure facilities. 
The interaction of FDI and trade openness bears a robust relationship with economic growth. 
This is in line with expectations more trade is expected to grow the economy, suggesting that FDI 
inflows are determined by the market and openness to trade of the host country. This is perfectly 
in line with the FDI theory. 
Finally the positive, but not significant estimated coefficient of the FDI*mineral-rich interaction 
term implies that we cannot conclude that FDI has a different effect on mineral-rich countries 
than it does in mineral-poor countries.  First, the continent is perceived as being inherently risky16. 
This perception of Africa is supported by the empirical evidence of Haque, Nelson and Matheson 
(1999), who find that commercial risk-rating agencies often rate African countries as riskier than 
                                                          
16 FDI inflows to Africa still lag behind those of other regions of the world. The expected surge of FDI inflow into 
the continent has not occurred. The myriad of explanations varies from bias against Africa because of its risks, 
inappropriate environment, political instability, incessant coup d’état and absence of rule of law.  
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warranted by Fundamentals. Second, due to lack of knowledge about the countries in the 
continent, investment decisions are often not guided by country-specific conditions, but rather 
based on inferences from the environment of neighbouring countries. Thus, to some extent, 
foreign investors evaluate African countries as if the countries in the continent constitute “one big 
country” 
 
Sensitivity Test of Endogeneity Problem 
The basic motivation of the existing theoretical and empirical work is the potential effect of FDI 
and economic growth. It should be noted that the cross-country regressions presented here may 
be subject to endogeneity problem. The correlation between FDI and growth rate could arise from 
an endogenous determination of FDI that is FDI itself may be influenced by innovations in the 
stochastic process governing growth rates. For instance, any omitted factors that raise the rate of 
return on capital will also increase both the growth rate and the inflow of foreign direct 
investment simultaneously.17 In these circumstances, there would exist a correlation between FDI 
and the country-specific error term, which would bias the estimated coefficients. 
Although, in principle, the endogeneity problem can be avoided by applying instrumental 
variable techniques, the fundamental problem is that there are no ideal instruments available. A 
good instrument would be a variable which is highly correlated with FDI but not with the error 
term in the regressions. Nevertheless, we have tried to control for the endogeneity problem by 
using as instruments the lagged values of FDI and the other explanatory variables in the 
regressions. 
 
                                                          
17 See Edwards (1990) for a discussion on determination of foreign direct investment in LDC. 
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Table 3.6: FDI and Growth:  Instrumental variables estimation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Capital       0.01*** 
(6.48) 
   0.02*** 
(4.20) 
0.03** 
(4.41) 
FDI    0.04**      0.01*** 0.03* 
 (2.00) (4.84)   (2.37) 
MVA      0.01***    0.1***       0.02*** 
 (3.81) (5.09)   (2.00) 
Human Capital 0.02***    0.03***     0.05*** 
 (24.20)    (30.51) (8.91) 
Inflation rate       -0.008***      -0.09***   - 0.02*** 
 -(6.02) -(7.42) -(3.93) 
Infrastructure      0.09***      0.02***    0.08** 
 (2.40)  (5.78) (4.82) 
Openness(T) 0.00*      0.09*** 0.04* 
 (1.59)    (2.39) (2.10) 
Government Size     0.01*** 
   (5.58)                                
        0.07*** 
   (3.30) 
    0.04*** 
(3.73) 
Interaction terms    
FDI*Human cap    0.20* 
   (3.58) 
FDI*Infrastructure        -0.003*** 
                -(2.66) 
FDI*Trade      0.03** 
                 (3.62) 
FDI*Mineral-rich   0.18 
   (1.45) 
Year Dummies NO YES  NO 
Country Dummies NO YES  NO 
Diagnostic Test    
R-Square 0.59 0.68    0.56 
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F-statistic 7.39 2.45    4.38 
No of Observations 1309 1310       1281 
Note: Robust t-statistics figure is shown in parenthesis, Significant at 1%*** ; 5%** and  10% * level of Significant. 
Using as instruments, the lagged value of FDI, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation was done the cross-
section of countries for the period 1970-2010 using the same instruments. 
 
The results of this instrumental variable estimation are reported in Table 3.6. The regression 
results reported in the three specifications show that the instrumental variable estimations yield 
qualitatively similar results to those obtained by baseline specification. The estimated coefficients 
on FDI and Economic growth are still significantly positive. The interaction terms with human 
capital and FDI are still significantly positive, but the same cannot be reported for interaction of 
FDI and infrastructure.  The interaction term between FDI and the trade openness indicator is 
positive and significant as reported in Table 3.6. This finding indicates the importance of trade 
liberalisation for productivity gains to realize from FDI.   
3.5: Conclusions 
This study investigates the impact of FDI on economic growth in SSA countries. Our results 
indicate that the effect of FDI on economic growth is positive and statistically significant on the 
key growth determinant variables (Domestic capital and Trade openness). We can argue that SSA 
countries should orient their economic policies to changes and improve the government 
consumption and more investment in human capital to support a sustainable economic growth 
because increased spending on advanced education and training contributes to economic growth 
by easing the adoption of foreign technologies. 
Our results, however, do support some previous findings that there is a level of human capital 
below which FDI impedes or contributes little to economic growth. For FDI to serve as an engine 
of growth and integrated into the mainstream of the economy, the absorptive capacity of its 
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citizens which is related to the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new information, 
assimilate and apply it to commercial use must be the objective of the host economy. 
  The interaction of FDI and mineral rich dummy implies that we cannot conclude that FDI 
has a different effect on mineral-rich countries than it does in mineral-poor countries. Although 
Sub-Saharan African countries are differently endowed with natural resources (crude oil, 
minerals, gold, iron ore, etc.) which in effect should contribute to their attracting FDI and 
improving the economic development of the region. Therefore, governments must improve 
political stability, law and order, socioeconomic conditions and the investment profile and must 
reduce the level of corruption to attract more FDI and domestic investment because of the value 
added in many sectors which reduces unemployment rate. 
The results have three policy implications. First, to enhance FDI flows, Sub-Saharan African 
countries need guided training of the human resources of their country to enable them to 
contribute positively to economic growth wherever they find themselves employed either with 
foreign or indigenous firms. Second, policies that have been successful in other regions should 
not be blindly replicated in SSA since these policies may have a differential impact on Africa. 
Finally, for sustainable economic development in SSA, development strategies in the region 
should focus on ways to attract both domestic and foreign investment. The political system 
should also be stable minimising the sources wasted due to corruption. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table 3.1: List of Variables, Description and Data Source 
Variable Description Source 
GDP per capita Real Gross Domestic product per Capita 
in 2000US$ constant prices 
World Development 
indicators (WDI) 
Exports as % of GDP  
(X) 
Exports of goods and services as a % of 
GDP 
WDI 
Imports as % of GDP 
(M) 
Imports of goods and services as a % of 
GDP 
WDI 
FDI net inflows as % of 
GDP (FDI) 
Weighted Average Net inflows (new 
investment inflows less disinvestment) as 
a % GDP 
WDI &IMF 
% Population with 
Secondary Education 
(HC) 
% of population  with Secondary 
Education as the highest level attained 
Barro& Lee (2010), 
WDI, IMF 
Government size 
(GOVCON) 
Government consumption as a ratio of 
GDP 
IMF, World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) 
Infrastructure  Number of telephone mainlines per 1000 
population. 
WDI & IMF(WEO). 
Capital stock Gross capital formation (GFCF) as 
percentage of GDP 
IMF& WDI. 
 
Inflation Rate of Inflation in percent IMF& WDI 
Manufacturing Value 
Added(MVA) 
Manufacturing value added as percentage 
of GDP 
IMF, WDI, UNCTAD 
Openness to trade (T) This is calculated as the ratio of exports 
plus imports over Real GDP. 
WDI 
Per capita growth(g) This is measured as the growth of real per 
capita GDP in constant dollars. 
WDI 
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Figure 3.1: The plots of real GDP growth
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CHAPTER 04 
OUTPUT AND INSTITUTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA) COUNTRIES 
4.1: Introduction 
The long tradition of the growth literature in explaining cross-country differences in income per 
capita has focused on factors of physical and human capital (Barro, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Lucas, 1998; Temple, 1999), innovation (Romer, 1990; Rebelo, 1991) and technological 
diffusion (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howit, 1992; Barro and Sala-i- Martin, 
1997). The quality of the institutional framework is a relatively new aspect in the ongoing puzzle 
of growth determinants (Oslon, 1996; Landes, 1998; Easterly, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2002; 
Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Asiedu, 2006; Ndulu et al., 2008; Booth, 
2011 and Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2014)). The widespread view among 
researchers and policy makers is that low economic performance in developing countries is the 
causal effect of poor-quality institutions, weak rule of law, absence of accountability, tight 
control over information, and high levels of corruption (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Ndulu, 
2006; Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian,2007; and Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson, 2014). In a 
neoclassical growth setting, the link between growth and institutions is described as follows: poor 
institutional quality is a serious impediment for both domestic and foreign investment; this 
decreases the level of capital deepening in the economy, which, in turn, lowers productivity 
growth and per capita income. This consideration has made institutions a key component in 
explaining income differentials across countries and the recent literature has included institutions 
as a source of economic growth. 
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Convergence of output per worker to the long-run steady state is conditional to factors related 
to institutions18 (see, for example, Hall and Jones, 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 
1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 1997).The institutional 
framework in a country affects economic performance through various channels. From a 
developing country’s perspective, a vital issue is the existence of broad related institutions to 
ensure that citizens are well-behaved within some standard social norms allowing mainly for 
economic activity to take place in an environment that fully respects property rights. 
Fundamental institutions such as the rule of law and the protection of property rights are still 
rudimentary in many African countries, where politicians and bureaucrats often abuse their 
power.19In the past few years, almost a quarter of Sub-Sahara African (SSA hereafter) countries 
have been involved in a regional (or civil) war or similar substantial internal strife (Gray and 
McPherson, 2001).The consequences of political instability are the disruption of domestic 
revenue, investment, production and trade. The economic activity is paralysed and there is a 
massive deterioration of productive capacity in the country (Wei, 2000a, 2000b; Haggard, 2004; 
Rodrik Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002; Daniele and Marani, 2006 and Johnson et al., 2007). In 
cases where SSA countries manage to improve governance as a result of institutional reforms, 
economic performance is much better even if countries are poor in oil and gas resources.20 
                                                          
18See for example, Easterly and Levine, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001. 
19 For example, phenomena in which political officers deliberately disobey court orders have been very common in 
Nigeria and Ghana, (Collier and Gunning, 1995). 
20 This is the case for Botswana, Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia which have become the fastest growing economies 
in the region. Their superior economic performance was mainly attributed to their sound institutional environment 
(Collier, 2007a; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). On the contrary, countries abundant in natural resources 
such as Nigeria, Niger, Zambia, Coted’voire and Mozambique have performed poorly because they fail to make 
improvements in crucial institutional aspects such as property rights, rule of law and sound monetary and fiscal 
policy.  
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SSA has experienced the slowest economic growth of any region in the world, with 
severe poverty to become continuously worse. Conventional factors of growth (physical and 
human capital accumulation) have weak explanatory power for Africa’s growth experience and 
the attention has more systematically turned into the institutional aspect (Aron, 1996, Djankov et 
al., 2002, Naude, 2004, and Robinson, 2010).Emphasis is given to the institutional environment 
among some other factors very crucial for this geographical region, such as tropical location 
(Sachs and Warner, 1997), cultural endowment and ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 
1997).  
The quality of institutions refers-among other factors-to property rights, rule of law and 
political stability that are viewed as the most fundamental determinants for protecting private 
investment. A well-functioning democratic regime is a key prerequisite for attracting domestic 
and foreign investment preventing the abuse of power from political and business elites. These 
considerations have also placed in the centre of attention another metrics of institutional quality 
such as government effectiveness, bureaucratic honesty, contract enforcement, and the rule of law. 
Following the previous discussion, one can identify a twofold role for institutions. First, 
well-established institutions ensure that national resources are used optimally, hence minimising 
slack and loss of productive capacity and second the existence of an appropriate institutional 
environment is a catalyst for improving effectiveness of other crucial growth determinants such 
as FDI. The main goal of this chapter is to investigate how different institutional measures (i.e. 
Property rights index, rule of law, corruption, political stability, bureaucratic delays, business 
regulation index, government effectiveness, regulatory quality) impact on GDP per capita in SSA, 
whereas we also consider the interaction of various institutions with other economic features that 
are expected to drive output per worker. 
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The present study contributes to the empirical growth literature for the African region in 
numerous ways. First, the evidence of this study covers the entire spectrum of the SSA countries 
(32) over a much longer time span 1970-2010 compared to previous studies. 21 Institutional 
changes take place at a slow pace and for that reason one needs to consider a relatively long time 
series in order to capture these changes. Studies with short time spans might mistakenly attribute 
short-run business cycle fluctuations to institutional changes, for instance, Zidi and Dhifallah 
(2013), includes 30 African countries, but for a shorter period, 1998-2011 and Jude and Levieuge 
(2013), using few African countries for the period, 1984-2009. Second, we analyse the dual 
character of institutions within a growth model framework, which has been previously neglected. 
On one hand, institutional quality is a necessary condition for a better use of the existing national 
resources, while on the other hand it creates the appropriate market augmenting framework for 
attracting FDI. The latter is of particular importance for capital scarce countries such as SSA. 
Third, the majority of previous studies on the role of institutions on economic development in 
SSA rely on qualitative analysis (North, 1990; Oslon, 1993), instead we analyse institutions 
within a rigorous growth set-up, which incorporates all the standard growth determinants found 
in the empirical literature (Dollar and Kraay, 2002;Ndulu, 2006 and Booth, 2011). 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 survey the key studies on the empirics 
of Growth and Institutions. Section 3 presents the structural model of output per worker with 
Human capital and Institutions. Section 4 discusses the data set used in the empirical analysis. 
Section 5 outlines the methodology and the empirical results. The last section concludes the 
result. 
                                                          
21 For example, Gyimah-Brempong, (2001) includes 21 African countries in total for a very short period, 1993-1999. 
Brautigam and Knack, (2004), refers to 1982-1997 and only for 24 SSA countries while Asiedu, (2006) uses 22 
countries for 1984-2000. 
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4.2: Survey of Key studies on the Empirics of Growth and Institutions. 
This section discusses some of the most recent studies in the area of institutions and 
growth highlighting their key findings. Acemoglu et al. (2001) (AJR hereafter) use mortality 
rates of colonial settlers as an instrument for the institutional quality, they argue that the settler 
mortality rate is a key aspect to understand the types of institutions that European colonisers 
established in areas such as Africa. AJR documents the evidence that, there is an almost linear 
relationship between log settler mortality and measure of institutions. This relationship shows 
that ex-colonies where Europeans faced higher mortality rates have substantially worse 
institutions. For instance, in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, where they settled, 
good institutions that enforced rule of law were established, and these encouraged investment in 
these colonies.  In the other extremes, as in the Congo or the Gold Coast, they set up extractive 
states with sole intention of transfer of resources back to their home country. These institutions 
were detrimental to investment and economic progress. The colonization strategy was in part 
determined by the feasibility of European settlement. In places where European faces very high 
mortality rates, they were more likely to set up extractive states. 
The key element of Alcala and Ciccone (2004) (AC hereafter), is to investigate the impact 
of trade openness on income per capita, including factors of institutional quality. The main 
finding is that trade openness remains the most crucial growth determinant while the institutional 
effect exists only as far as capital-output ratio and human capital are concerned. This can be 
viewed as the indirect effect of institutions in the sense that better institutions stimulate capital 
deepening (as already mentioned), which in turn can boost productivity and growth. Easterly and 
Levine (2003) (EL hereafter), run regressions of the levels of income on various measures of 
endowments, institutions and policies. The main results are that institutions exert an important 
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effect on development, while endowments do not, other than through their effect on institutions. 
Policies also do not exert any independent development. Rodrik et al. (2004) (RST hereafter) 
emphasise the superiority of institutions over geography and integration in economic 
development, using recently developed instruments for institutions and trade to control for 
endogeneity bias in the econometric estimation. They argued that quality of institutions is most 
fundamental, determinant of huge cross-country differences in income per capita than geography, 
integration, landlocked and culture. 
Another large body of literature focuses on the role of institutions in affecting the 
incentives for investment in physical capital, human capital and innovation, (Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Eicher and Leukert, 2006). These studies show that good 
institutions encourage private investment, improve the overall efficiency of the economy and thus 
significantly contribute to growth. In the light of these arguments, we expect sound institutional 
quality to favour technology transfer and productivity spillovers to domestic firms, while 
promoting crowding-in effects on domestic investment. The existing evidence on this particular 
nexus is still very limited. Some exceptions are the study of Busse and Groizard (2008) that 
investigate the role of business regulations in both developed and developing countries. Their 
main argument is that countries with restrictive regulations cannot exploit FDI inflows efficiently 
due to constraints in factor reallocation. On the contrary, Farole and Winkler (2012), show that 
business freedom has no significant effect on intra-productivity spillovers and institutions. Both 
of these studies use cross-sectional analysis, capturing only individual heterogeneity at a specific 
period without controlling for time heterogeneity. Jude and Levieuge (2013), explore the role of 
the institutional environment on growth with various alternative econometric techniques. The 
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critical element of this study is that institutions matter for growth regardless the country’s level of 
development. 
Kaufman et al. (2009) find significant evidence for the impact of institutions and related 
economic policies on medium and long-term growth. Additionally, Cavalcanti and Novo (2005) 
show that: (i) the marginal contributions of institutions are larger at the bottom quartiles of the 
(conditional) distribution of output per worker, which implies that, poor countries are likely to 
benefit more from better institutions, and (ii) the conditional distribution of output per worker 
tends to become less disperse as countries reach higher levels of institutional development. 
Therefore, institutions are fundamental not only in promoting growth (output per worker) but also 
in promoting the convergence in output per worker across nations. Other recent studies in the 
growth-governance (institutions) nexus can be found in Chong and Calderson, (2000), Ahrens 
and Meurers, (2002), Dollar and Kraay, (2002), Isksson, (2007), Zhauang, (2010) and Akinlo 
(2011). These studies highlight the existence of several channels through which improvement in 
the protection of property rights can affect physical investment and also investment in financial 
assets. First, investors will be more willing to invest their capital when property rights are more 
protected, and as result, they have confidence that their returns may not be appropriated. Second, 
institutions also lay the foundation for the operation of the capital market and lastly, these studies 
have emphasised the importance of financial institutions to investment. 
The cross-country growth analysis encounters some standard data challenges. The 
existing studies-in their attempt- to control for the impact of institutions on growth use some 
controversial factors. More precisely, Easterly and Levine (1997) use the number of 
assassinations to proxy for social disturbance while Alesina and Perotti (1996) use the number of 
assassinations, deaths, coups and demonstrations to compute an index of political instability. 
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Alesina et al., (1996b) approximate political instability using dummy variables that indicate 
regime change, regular and irregular transfer of executive power. Fosu (2001) measures political 
instability using three variants of ‘coup plots’, namely successful, abortive, and officially 
reported coups. Collier and Gunning (1999) use the number of months of war in a country to 
proxy for social disturbance. These measures are only proxies and thus can be subject to 
alternative interpretations. The present study 22 applies a set of variables that capture the 
institutional environment and its various aspects more appropriately. This novelty is another 
crucial contribution of the present study to the current literature.  
  
                                                          
22An important strength of our study is the use of newly assemble series from variety of sources, details of which 
are contained in the Appendix. It is important to stress that these data enable us not only to estimate diverse 
specification, but also to construct measures of key variables that often closer to theoretical ideas than those used 
in the previous studies. 
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4.3: A structural Model of Output per Worker with Human Capital and Institutions 
The theoretical approach adopted in this study draws upon Solow (1956) growth model and 
the subsequent empirical modifications of Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995). The departure point is a standard production function with three inputs, physical capital, 
human capital and labour. The model also includes an exogenous efficiency parameter. Output in 
country in country c is determined from the following production function: 
( , , )c c c c cY A f K L H=                                                                     (4.1) 
Y is the quantity of output, K is physical capital, H is human capital and L is  labour.  Parameter 
A indicates technology in country c. The Cobb-Douglas approximation of this production 
function is written as: 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))c c c c cY t K t H t A t L t
α β α β− −=                                           (4.2) 
The model assumes decreasing returns to scale (DRS) for the capital inputs (i.e. 1α β+ <  ) 
while overall the production function is subject to constant returns to scale (CRS).  Parameter α
is the partial elasticity of output with respect to physical capital and β  is the partial elasticity of 
output with respect to human capital. It is assumed that the technology parameter A has two 
components: economic efficiency ( )I t  that depends on institutions as well as other economic 
policy variables and the level of exogenous technical progress ( )tΩ . This assumption implies that 
the rate of change in parameter A is not common across countries as assumed in the original 
model. The rate of exogenous technical change can be common across countries, while the 
factors (i.e. Institutions) affecting the efficiency component of A are country variant. The 
efficiency component ( )I t can be written as log-linear function of institutional variablesV of type 
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j, while the latter ( )tΩ is assumed to grow at rate ( )g t common for all countries. Labour input 
( )L t  grows at a rate of ( )n t .These can describe the model as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )c cA t I t t= Ω                         (4.3) 
                                        
ln ( ) jc o j c
j
I t Vθ θ= +∑             (4.4) 
                                    ( ) ( ) ( )t g t tΩ = Ω                         (4.5) 
( ) ( ) ( )c c cL t n t L t=                                               (4.6) 
Let assume that the share of investment in physical and human capital is constant at ks
and hs  respectively, and that both types of capital depreciate at a common rateδ . We express 
(4.1) in per labour effective units as follows: 
                                                ( ) ( ) ( )c c cy t k t h t
α β=                                                                       (4.7) 
Lower case letters define variables per units of effective labour as: 
  /y Y AL=  , /k K AL= , /h H AL=  
The evolution of the economy with respect to physical and human capital is determined by the 
following conditions: 
                                ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c k c c c ck t s y t n g k tδ∆ = − + +                                            (4.8) 
                                  ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c h c c c ch t s y t n g h tδ∆ = − + +   (4.9) 
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The above equations imply that the steady state values of physical and human capital are given 
by the following expressions: 
                                            
1
1 1
* k hs sk
n g
β β α β
δ
− − − 
=   + + 
                          (4.10) 
                                           
1
1 1
* k hs sh
n g
α α α β
δ
− − − 
=   + + 
 (4.11) 
Substituting the steady state values (4.10) and (4.11) into the production function (4.7), taking 
logs and re-arranging we obtain: 
, ,
ln ( ) ln ( ) ln( )
1
ln ln
1 1
c c
c
k c h c
Y t A t n g
L
s s
α β δ
α β
α β
α β α β
+  = − + +  − − 
+ +
− − − −
                  (4.12) 
Equation (4.12) states that income per capita in the long run is a function of physical investment 
share and human capital share. Further, we decompose parameter A allowing for the institutional 
effect on output per capita.  Equation (4.12) is now written as: 
 
, ,
ln ( ) ln( )
1
ln ln
1 1
j
o j c
jc
k c h c
Y t V g n
L
s s
α βθ θ δ
α β
α β
α β α β
+  = + − + +  − − 
+ +
− − − −
∑
 (4.13) 
The functional form of equation (4.13) is a modification of the Solow model augmented for 
institutions and human capital and it will be used as a benchmark specification to investigate the 
determinants of income per capita in SSA countries for the period 1970-2010.   
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4.4:      Dataset 
4.4.1 General Description 
An important strength of the study is the use of rich new panel data set from a variety of 
sources. The data is annual, for 32 Sub-Saharan African countries. The study briefly outline the 
content of each variable here, a more detailed description can be found in Appendix Table 4.1. 
Another important strength of our data is the four-decade time period utilised here. To implement 
this model our focus will be on measurement of human capital and institutional variables, more 
importantly, our data will explore the effect of adding human-capital accumulation and good 
institutions to the Solow growth model. 
Data on GDP per capita were taken from World Bank’s Development Indicators (WBDI). 
Data are expressed in constant 2000 USD. Human capital is measured by years of schooling in 
the population aged 15 and over which is taken from Barro and Lee (2000).  Investment in 
physical capital is proxied by Gross Fixed Capita Formation as a share of GDP which is taken 
from World Bank’s Development Indicators.  Population which is the annual growth rate of the 
working age population were taken from World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI) and FDI 
data are taken from various issues of the International Monetary Fund and International Financial 
Statistics and World Bank’s Development Indicators (WBDI).To capture institutional quality, we 
use several indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2003) and La Porta et al., (1999); this includes 
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, government effectiveness,  rule of law 
and regulatory quality. For the period 1970-1979, all series have missing values for most SSA 
countries. Our complementary sources for gathering information for missing values during this 
period include Corruption Index from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), UNECA 
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database and African Development Bank (ADB database) and Statistical Bulletin of Central 
Bank of SSA countries. 
4.4.2; Definition of Variables 
This study uses an unbalanced panel of 32 African countries for the period 1970-201023.For 
the purpose of our research, we considered first, the measure of investment in physical capital 
which we proxy by ks which is the fraction of income invested in physical capital (typically 
proxied by the share of investment in GDP) is one of the main factors determining the   level of 
real output per capita. For the human-capital accumulation ( )hs  measures approximately the 
percentage of the working-age population that is in secondary school. Again, we assume that g  
and δ  are constant across countries. g reflects primarily the advancement of knowledge, which 
is not country-specific. And there is neither any strong reason to expect depreciation rates to vary 
greatly across countries, nor are there any data that would allow us to estimate country-specific 
depreciation rates, as such n g d+ +  will be  measure as n  which is the average rate of growth of 
the working-age population, where working age is defined as 15 to 6424. For the institutional 
variables we considered 5 socio-political indicators related to political risk, namely: corruption, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and political stability. Institutional 
variables are hard to measure and quantify. For instance corruption often involves illegal 
activities, most corrupt practices are hidden, and such acts are not easily quantifiable. For most 
indicators data on African countries were not covered until 1997. Prior to 1997, I have relied on 
                                                          
23 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cote d’voire, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Nambia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra-Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
24Data on the fraction of the population of working age are from the World Bank’s Development Indicators (WBDI). 
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historical data from the National accounts and Central Bank of the countries covered. Corruption 
data from International Country Risk Guide range from 0-6; low scores indicate high corruption 
while high scores indicate less corruption. For the rule of law index measurement, we follow 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) and Kaufmann, Kraay, &Mastruzzi (2010)25. This index 
measures the quality of contract enforcement, the quality of police and courts of law and the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The rule of law index ranges from 0 to 6 with 0 reflecting the 
lowest incidence of the rule of law and 6 reflecting the highest. The index of political stability 
measures the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilised by unconstitutional 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This index captures the idea that the 
likelihood of frequent changes in government can affect the quality of governance by affecting 
the continuity of policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004). Thus the index ranges from a 
scale of 0 (less democratic) to 6 (strongly democratic). The government effectiveness index made 
available by the World Bank Development Indicators, indicate the ability of the government to 
formulate policies. Like the political stability index, it is scaled from 0-6. Low scores indicate 
less government effectiveness and high scores indicate better quality of governance. Finally the 
regulatory quality index measures policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. The index ranks economies from 0-6; low scores indicate weak enforceability. In 
general, these indicators are widely recognised and used as high-quality measures of political risk 
and institutions 26 . Table 4.4 (Appendix) reports the correlation matrix for the quality of 
institutional indices. Table 4.5 presents the summary of descriptive statistics using data averaged 
                                                          
25See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf. Rule of law as our institutions measure also fits well 
with North’s (1990) view that the ‘inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is 
the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World’ 
26In recent years, they have been used, for instance, by Bassanini, A., Scarpetta, S and Hemmings (2001), Rodrick et 
al., (2004), Busse&Hefeker (2005) and Cristina J. & Gregory L. (2013). 
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over 1970-2010.  There are considerable cross-country variations in the data. The variables vary 
greatly across countries. For instance, the corruption index from our summary statistic ranges 
from 0.01 to 5.87 with 0.01 reflecting the incidence of high corruption in some of the countries in 
SSA. Again the rule of law index ranges from 0.03 to 5.72 with0.03 reflecting the lowest 
incidence of the rule of law and 5.72 reflecting the highest. 
Table 4.5: Summary statistics of included variables: Sample 32 Countries (1970-2010) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
GDP per capita                1312 6.32 1.54 4.63 13.51 
Physical cap                    1312 18.69 8.81 2.00 76.69 
Human Capital                1311 26.34 22.02 1.01 124.74 
Population growth           1312 53.16 3.70 47.00 71.21 
FDI   1312 5.43 8.28 6.90-0.07 111 
Corruption   1312 1.98 1.27 0.01 5.87 
Gov effectiveness  1312 1.99 1.27 0.01 5.87 
Political Stability        1312 1.80 1.16  0.01 5.94 
Rule of Law 1312 1.79 1.10 0.03 5.72 
Regulatory quality 1312 1.99 1.27 0.01 5.88 
Source: World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI), International Country Risk Guide 
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4.4.3 Econometric Model 
This section, presents the econometric model used to estimate an unbalanced panel of for 32 
countries over the period (1970-2010). We control for unobserved country heterogeneity by using 
country fixed effects, similarly we use year dummies to capture common macroeconomic effects 
across countries. To assess the roles which institutional quality exert on output, we use a standard 
growth, regression framework which mostly follows others’ work (Barro 1991; Mankiw et al., 
1992; and Levine and Renelt, 1991) in the literature. 
                                          1 1itIny α β∆ = + I 2it β+ X it itε+                                                           (4.14) 
Where y measured GDP per capita in country i at year t ,I stand for institutional variables, 
whereas X is the vector of other control variables that determine growth such as domestic 
investment, population growth and human capital, finally equation (4.14) is augmented with a 
well behaved error, iε  with zero mean and constant variance. 
The traditional growth regressions generally carry the problems like endogenous regressors, 
measurement errors and omitted variables (see Acemoglu (2009)). Given these problems, least 
square estimations are biased since unobserved omitted variables may potentially correlate with 
one of the regressors. The use of panel data helps alleviate the problem of omitted variables by 
taking into account of country and time specific effects (Islam, 1995), thus allowing the 
unobserved time-in-variant country specific effect to be  controlled for. Our growth models are 
therefore estimated using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), least squared dummy variables 
(LSDV) and fixed effect methods. 
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Table4.6: Output and Institutions: Baseline Specification,   Dep. Variable: GDP per capita 
Variables POLS LSDV FE 
In ( )kS  0.31*** 
(7.81) 
0.12*** 
(8.29) 
0.12*** 
(8.73) 
ln ( )hum  0.56*** 
(23.50) 
0.15*** 
(8.21) 
0.07*** 
(5.93) 
In ( )n g d+ +  3.02*** 
(9.89) 
2.41*** 
(14.68) 
1.99*** 
14.45) 
Institutional Variables   
Corruption 0.05*** 
(2.84) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.009***                           
- (1.76) 
Gov. Effectiveness 0.11***                                       
(1.97) 
-0.008 
(-0.01) 
0.006 
(1.03) 
Political stability 0.11***                                                      
(6.94) 
0.06***
(9.76) 
0.02*** 
(9.84) 
Rule of Law 0.05*** 
(2.90) 
0.008 
(1.25) 
0.006 
(1.03) 
Regulatory quality 0.031 
(1.46) 
-0.008 
(-0.12) 
-0.003 
(-0.48) 
Year Dummies No Yes No 
Country Dummies No Yes No 
Diagnostic Test    
R-Square 0.56 0.97 0.17 
No of Observations 1311 1311 1312 
Notes: GDP per capita is the output over four decades. Numbers in brackets below coefficient refer to t-statistics. 
Asterisks denote significance as follows, *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Robust standard errors were used in 
obtaining these t-statistics. The estimator used in all specifications is OLS, LSDV and FE with country and year 
dummies where specified. 
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4.5 Empirical findings 
Table 4.6, presents regressions of the log of GDP per capita on the log of investment in 
physical capital accumulation (log )kS  the log of n g δ+ + , log of the percentage of labour force 
in secondary school (log )H and measures of corruption, government effectiveness, political 
stability, rule of law and regulatory quality. The estimated coefficients and implied parameters 
for the basic factors driving the growth, physical capital accumulation, human capital and 
population growth appear with the expected signs and are highly significant. The coefficients for 
physical capital accumulation and human capital are broadly consistent with the empirical 
literature. However, our result on population growth is in contrast with some other studies on 
growth (see, for example, Mankiw et al.,1992; Bassanini et al.,2001) that have found no or very 
limited effects of this variable on growth, our result attributed to the labour intensive nature of the 
economy in SSA countries. 
The Physical Capital variable coefficient is significant and positive, showing that the rate of 
physical capital (typically proxied by the share of investment in GDP) is one of the main factors 
determining the level of output per worker. Endogenous growth models (Barro, 1990; Romer, 
1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Lucas, 1998; Temple, 199) allow for more permanent effects of 
increases in investment on the steady state growth rate of output per capita. First, the 
technological progress could, to some extent, be embodied in the process of investment. Second, 
the introduction of new capital may lead to better organisation and efficiency even if no new 
technology is incorporated in the capital equipment. It could also be assumed that the growth rate 
of labour productivity of workers operating on new machines could be related to investment in 
new technology. 
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Human Capital variable in these augmented models compared the role of human capital to that of 
physical capital, in so far as its accumulation implies capital deepening with an associated period 
of accelerated growth towards a new steady state. This variable has a positive and significant 
relationship with GDP per capita in those countries, indicating that investment in human capital 
(e.g. higher expenditures on education and training) might play a more persistent role in the 
growth process. Lucas (1998), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) 
argued that advances in technological progress often have strong links with education, especially 
at the higher level. 
Population growth has a larger impact on output per capital than the textbook model indicates. In 
the textbook model higher population growth lowers income because the available capital must 
be spread more thinly over the population of workers. In the augmented model a well-educated 
workforce would increase the output per worker because of new innovations. 
Corruption variable has negative and significant relationship with output in LSDV and FE. The 
implications of this result suggested that corruption do not provide any evidence or support for 
output worker. Previous studies (Barro 1991 and Mauro 1993) have shown that corrupt, unstable 
governments spend less on education because corruption opportunities may be less abundant on 
education than on other components of government expenditure. Corrupt practices has affected 
the economy of SSA countries, when the economy it’s below its steady-state income level, higher 
corruption could lead to lower growth, for a given level of income. Mauro (1995) argues that 
corruption may lead to more bureaucratic delay. For instance, when individuals offer speed 
money to officials, they contribute to establishing a custom, so that the granting of, say, a work 
permit will be artificially delay until a bribe is received. 
82 
 
Government effectiveness has a positive sign for POLS, but negative for the other two 
specifications which are not statistically significant and cannot be relied on. Thus, the 
government effectiveness indicator denotes the quality of public service provision, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. Thus, theoretically, if government 
institutions were functioning efficiently by reducing costs of transactions, there would be an 
increase in the productivity and in turn would stimulate and improve output per worker, thus 
economic growth. Some countries in Sub-Saharan African countries (Botswana, Mauritius, 
South-Africa, Seychelles, and Ethiopia) that have succeeded in ensuring what is generally now 
described as “good governance” as a result of good institutions tends to be faring well and has 
become the fastest growing economies in Africa (Collier, 2007). 
Political stability has a positive and significant relation with output as expected. First, it can be 
argued that political stability has a significant effect on the level of investment as it increases 
investor confidence in a particular county while political instability could discourage the level of 
investment and growth in an economy. The estimate of political stability equally suggests that a 
more stable political framework increases business confidence thus stimulating economic activity. 
In a more stable political environment trade and investment are strongly encouraged improving 
the degree of technical efficiency in national production. This finding is consistent with the 
submission of Asiedu (2000) and Abeyasinghe (2004). 
The Rule of Law indicator has a positive and significant relationship with output, meaning that 
the economies that adhere to rule of law will have a higher output per worker. More recently, all 
countries in Sub-Saharan African countries are improving their judicial institutions because rules 
are absent, rules are suboptimal, or useful rules are poorly enforced. For instance, constitutions 
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abound in Africa, but many are ineffective. Nearly all the countries in this region have one 
problem or the other ranging from terrorist attack in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon and flagrant 
disobey of court orders by government in Zambia, Uganda and Mali. African courts generally 
work less reliably, the legal process often involves long delays, and most judicial officers appear 
to be moderately knowledgeable about the law. Our findings indicate that most governments in 
these countries believe the presence of clear protection of property rights and strict adherence to 
rule of law is the key element in the institutional environment that shapes economic performance 
and improves output per worker. 
The regulatory quality variable has a negative and significant relationship with output suggesting 
that many of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa formulate and implement policies and 
regulations that do not permit and promote private sector development. It also suggests that 
market-unfriendly policies such as the price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as 
excessive regulation in areas, such as foreign trade and business development. 
 
4.5.1. Additional policy influences on Output 
Aside from the institutional factors that are likely to have an impact on output per capita 
by influencing the efficiency with which product and labour market operate; foreign direct 
investment (FDI) will also have significant influence on output per capita in SSA economy. FDI 
is a composite bundle of capital stock, know-how, and technology, which can augment the 
existing stock of knowledge through labour training, skill acquisition and diffusion to the 
domestic economy. 
Theoretically, FDI in the neoclassical growth model promotes economic growth by 
increasing the volume of investment and/or its efficiency. In the endogenous growth model, FDI 
84 
 
raises economic growth by generating technological diffusion from the developed world to the 
host country (Borenztein, Gregorio and Lee, 1998; Li and Liu, 2005).Table 4.7 presents the 
regression results of the log of GDP per capita on FDI, and the interaction between FD1 and the 
institutional variables. 
Table 4.7: Output and FDI and Interaction terms, Dependent Variable: GDP per capita 
Variables Fixed Effect Estimation 
FDI 0.008*** 
(4.72) 
FDI*Corruption -0.02*** 
(-3.80) 
FDI*Government effectiveness 0.0002 
(1.24) 
FDI*Political Stability   0.002*** 
(3.96) 
FDI*Rule of law -0.002*** 
(-2.62) 
FDI*Regulatory quality -0.0005 
(-0.86) 
Diagnostic Test 
R-Square       0.38   
No of Observations     1311   
Notes: GDP per capita is the output over four decades. Numbers in brackets below coefficient refer to t-statistics. 
Asterisks denote significance as follows, *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Robust standard errors were used in 
obtaining these t-statistics. The estimator used in this specification is fixed effect method. 
FDI variable only exerts a positive effect on output per worker. This result indicates FDI 
is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology, contributing in larger measure than the 
domestic investment (see Borensztein et al., 1998). FDI also increases the rate of technical 
progress in the host country through the “contagion” effect of the more advanced technology, 
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management practices etc. On the basis of this assertion most countries in Sub-Saharan African 
economy has relied on FDI inflows because of its acknowledged advantages. 
 The interaction of FDI and corruption has a negative sign, meaning that a high level of 
corruption is likely to attract low-technology, resource exploiting FDI, with limited growth 
potential. Countries produce high levels of output per worker in the long run if they invest in 
inputs with a high level of productivity. Although economic theory is ambiguous on the ultimate 
effects of corruption on FDI, it does propose several different mechanisms that can discourage 
FDI, including corrupt institutions acting as a tax on investment and heightened insecurity and 
uncertainty (see, for instance, Wei (2000) and Wijeweera (2010)).The interaction of FDI and rule 
of law variables has negative sign which is suggestive of the fact that the incidence of crime is 
very high in SSA countries and this will serve as deterrent to foreign investors. The interaction of 
FDI and political stability show that foreign investors are highly sensitive to changes in political 
stability and a framework in which governments operate. Fundamental democratic rights, like 
civil liberties and political rights do matter to multinationals operating in developing countries, 
when we control for other factors that affect FDI flows. 
Therefore, it can be argued that institutional quality clearly modulates the effect of FDI on 
economic growth in SSA countries. Therefore, a favourable institutional environment induces a 
growth enhancing effect. Promotion policies targeted to attract FDI will have no benefit for host 
countries unless there is an improvement of their institutional framework. 
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4.5.2 Controlling for Endogeneity 
This subsection will verify whether the results obtained in the previous section are robust 
to controlling for endogeneity. It is not known whether institutions cause development or 
development implies better institutions. Countries with higher per capita income might, for 
instance, develop better ways to protect private property, sound rule of law and, therefore, adopt 
better institutions. Therefore, an OLS procedure might yield biased estimates on the effect of 
institutions on development. There are numbers of obvious potential problems with the OLS 
regression. First is the endogeneity of the institutional measurement. Increases in income may 
lead to a demand for and realisation of better institutions. Also, all the institutional measures are 
subjective and this may bias our estimates. Second, there is likely to be a considerable 
measurement error in our measurement of institutional quality. Third, there are likely to be many 
omitted variables possibly correlated with both GDP per capita and institutional quality in the 
OLS estimates. A key issue with using 2SLS is to identify appropriate instruments that are 
correlated with the endogenous variable, institutions in this case but being uncorrelated with the 
error term. Among the variables being considered as valid instruments for institutions are ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, distance to the equator across countries (Mauro 1995, Hall and Jones 
1999, Acemoglu et al 2001). 
This study use a set of two instruments, the share of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries that speaks English, the share that speaks a major European language and climatic 
conditions (following Hall and Jones, 1999 and Dollar and Kraay, 2003). These instruments 
capture the influence of colonial origin on current institutional quality. The choice of these 
instruments was based on two plausible reasons. First, Western Europeans were more likely to 
settle in areas with similar climate to Western Europe, which again points to the regions far from 
the equator. Second, Europeans colonizers did seek to conquer and exploit areas of the world that 
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were rich in natural resources such as oil, gold and silver and nearly all the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa has this feature. 
The study uses dummy variable with value 1 if the country was colonised by Britain and the 
English legal code was transferred and 0 if the country was colonised by another major European 
country and their legal code was transferred an a dummy variable with value 1 if the country is an 
oil producer and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4.8: IV Results, Two-stage least squares: Dependent Variable: GDP per capita 
Variable   (1)                    (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FDI   0.007*** 
(1.87)             
0.02*** 
(6.94) 
0.13***   
(4.81)                 
0.12*** 
(3.05)                    
0.02***                   
(5.81) 
ln(hum)   0.55***     
 (14.59)          
0.56***    
 (20.99)       
(0.56) 
(16.74) 
0.44***    
(8.70)                   
0.56*** 
(19.46) 
ln(n+g+d) 2.13***     
(3.89)              
2.64***    
  (7.25)                             
2.87 ***    
 (6.16)                
3.13***     
(5.91)                               
2.56*** 
(6.44)
Corruption    0.69*** 
(4.39) 
    
Gov effectiveness                                                0.38*** 
(4.76)    
   
Political Stability                                                                             0.26
(1.52) 
  
Rule of Law                                                                                                            -0.63
(-2.84) 
 
Regulatory quality                                                                                                                              0.46 
(4.78) 
No. of Observations             1312 1312 1312 1312 1312 
R2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.59 0.38 
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP. All regressors are expressed in logs. The instruments for 
indicators of institution are language and oil. . Numbers in brackets below coefficient refer to t-statistics. Asterisks 
denote significance as follows, **** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
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Table 4.8 presents the results of the instrumental variables (IV) estimation. The instruments for 
institutions and integration are sensible, and have been demonstrated to work (Hall and Jones; 
Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Alcala and Ciccone, 2004) in the sense of producing strong second- 
stage results. The results in Table 4.8 show that the 2SLS coefficients are generally similar to 
those of OLS procedure. The institution measure in Column 1 shows a positive significant 
relationship with GDP per capita. The result, it’s not surprising, corruption in Sub-Saharan 
African countries is “endemic” as such corrupt practices such as speed money would enable 
individuals to avoid bureaucratic delays. Previous studies have argued that corruption may raise 
economic growth through two types of mechanisms. First, corrupt practices such as “speed 
money” would enable individuals to avoid bureaucratic delay. Second, government employees 
who are allowed to levy bribes would work harder, especially in the case where bribe acts as 
piece rate. Treisman (2007) documents the evidence that some countries seem to have grown 
rapidly in recent decades despite the perception that their states were highly corrupt, for example, 
China, South Korea, Thailand, India and Indonesia. Columns 3 of the table present the result of 
Political instability variable which equally has a positive and significant relationship with GDP 
per capita growth. Political instability has become a big problem for nearly all countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The region has been far more subject to coups than other regions (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005). Political instability in Africa has been tactically influenced by the ‘Big economic 
powers’ like China, Russia, America and Europe who provide a haven for stolen funds by 
African political leaders. The suggested plausible reason for this observation is that investments 
in Sub-Saharan African (being mostly in extractive sector) are so profitable that the return after 
adjusting for risk is quite substantial; hence the investors could not be discouraged by political 
instability and non-adherence to the rule of law. 
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 The results are robust to the inclusion of the identity of colonizer and natural resources a country 
has. La Porta et.al. (1999) argue that the type of legal system historically adopted in a country or 
imported through colonization has an important bearing on the development of institutions and 
hence on GDP per capita. The argument advanced in this paper is that a large population made it 
profitable for the Europeans to set up extractive institutions, with political power concentrated in 
the hands of a small elite. Europeans were more likely to set up extractive institutions in places 
they did not settle, high population density also made the development of institutions of private 
property less likely. In countries where the colonizers encountered relatively few health hazards 
to European settlement, they erected solid institutions that protected property rights and 
established rule of law. In other areas, their interests were limited to extracting as much resources 
as possible, and they showed little interest in building high-quality institutions. And in nearly all 
the countries in Sub-Saharan African countries the colonizers were interested in extracting their 
resources and not interested in maintaining quality institutions. 
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4.6: Conclusions 
This study has used a newly assembled data set consisting of historical indices to provide 
empirical evidence on the variation in the levels and rate of growth of output across countries. 
Our results indicate that the augmented model is consistent with the international evidence and 
that difference in physical capital accumulation, education attainment, and institutional quality 
should explain cross-country differences in output per worker and income per capita in Sub-
Saharan African countries. The examination of the data indicates that standard input and the 
institutional quality variables do explain most of the variation in these countries. 
Using recently developed instruments for institutions and trade. The results point that Sub-
Saharan African countries tend to have corrupt, cumbersome bureaucracies and to be politically 
unstable due to poor rule of law. This may have played a considerable role in bringing about low 
output and productivity growth, thus leading to poverty. This finding holds in OLS, LSVD and 
FE, settings. In order to check the robustness of our results, we also run the log of GDP per capita 
on institutions and other additional control variables as suggested by Easterly and Levine (2003). 
We observe that the sign and statistical significance of all coefficients on measured institutions 
are robust to the introduction of additional control variables. A consistent finding of two decades 
of economic research is that institutions matter for economic growth (Acemoglu, 2009; Andersen 
and Jensen (2013). 
The results have three policy implications. First, the policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
should strive hard to maintain better institutions as this will encourage entrepreneurs to invest in 
both physical and human capital. Second, a related issue of the business environment is the 
importance of consciously curbing corruption in this region. Agencies should be established to 
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fight corruption so as to convince both foreigners and nationals that the region is a safe place to 
invest. Finally, the government should find a lasting solution to political tensions, conflicts and 
risks of terrorist attacks as this has served as deterrents to foreign investments in those regions. 
The empirical findings in this study suggest a partial explanation for the stylised fact that poor 
countries tend to have corrupt, cumbersome bureaucracies and to be politically unstable. As 
institutional inefficiency persists over time, the bad institutions in the past may have played a 
considerable role in bringing about low output and productivity, thus leading to poverty today. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.1: The dimensions of governance from Kaufmann et al. (2004) 
Variable Description No of Obs.  
Political stability 
and absence of 
violence 
 
It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly 
unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic 
violence and terrorism 
140 
 
Government 
effectiveness 
 
In constructing this index, the authors combine responses on 
the quality of public service provision, the quality of 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of civil from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. 
140 
 
Regulatory quality 
 
It is more focused on the policies themselves. It includes 
measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such 
as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation 
in areas such as foreign trade and business development. 
140 
 
Rule of law 
 
  It means the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society and it includes perceptions of the 
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and the predictability of 
the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. These 
indicators measure the extent of protection of property rights 
and also the success of a society in developing an 
environment where fair and predictable rules form the basis 
of the economic and social interactions. 
140 
 
Control of 
corruption 
 
It measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined 
as the exercise of public power for private gain. According to 
their definition, the presence of corruption represents a failure 
of the governance. 
140 
 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2004) 
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Table 4.2: Determinants of quality of governments from La porta et al., (1999) 
Variable Description and source No. of obs. 
Property Rights 
index 
 
A rating of property rights in each country (on a scale from 1 
to 5). The more protection private property rights receive, the 
higher the score. The score is based, broadly, on the degree of 
legal protection of private property, the extent to which the 
government protects and enforces laws that protect private 
property, and the country’s legal protection to private 
property. Source: 1997 Index of Economic Freedom 
149 
Business 
Regulation 
Index 
 
A rating of regulation policies related to opening a business 
and keeping open a business (on a scale from 1 to 5). Higher 
score means that regulations are straight-forward and applied 
uniformly to all businesses and that regulations are less of a 
burden to business. Source: 1997 Index of Economic freedom. 
149 
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption in government index. Low ratings indicate “high 
government officials are likely to demand special payments” 
and “illegal payments are generally expected at lower levels 
of government” in the form of bribes connected with import 
and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy 
protection, or loans”. Scale from 0 to 10. Average of the 
months of April and October in the monthly index between 
1982 and 1995. 
126 
 
 
Bureaucratic 
delays 
An indicator of bureaucratic delays (red tape). Low ratings 
indicate lower levels of red tape in the bureaucracy of the 
country. Scale from 0 to 10. The index is published three 
times per year. The data are the average over the 1972-1995 
periods. Source: Business Environmental Risk Intelligence’s 
(BERI) Operation Risk Index. 
60 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
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Table 4.3: List of Variables, Description and Data Source 
Variable Description Source 
GDP per capita Real Gross Domestic product per Capita in 
2000US$ constant prices 
WDI (2011) 
 Corruption 
 
Measure the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gains and capture of the state 
by elites and private interest. 
WDI, IMF ,ADB 
(2012)& UNECA 
(2012) 
Government 
effectiveness 
 
Measure the quality of public services, the quality 
and quality of policy formulation and the credibility 
of the governments’ commitment to such policies. 
WDI (2011), IMF 
(2011), ADB 
(2012) & 
UNECA (2012) 
Political stability Measure the likelihood that government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means including domestic violence or 
terrorism. 
WDI (2011), IMF 
(2011),ADB 
(2012) & 
UNECA (2012) 
Rule of Law It measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. 
ADB & UNECA 
(2012) WDI, IMF 
Regulatory quality Measure the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies that promote private 
sector development. 
IMF, WEO 
Human capital It measures approximately the percentage of the 
working-age population that is in secondary school. 
WDI (2011) & 
ADB (2012) 
Population growth The annual growth rate of working age population WDI (2011) 
Physical Capita 
accumulation 
Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. WDI (2011) 
Infrastructure Number of telephone mainlines per 1000 population WDI & IMF 
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Openness  This is calculated as the ratio of exports plus 
imports over Real GDP 
WDI, IMF 
FDI net inflows as % 
of GDP 
Weighted Average net inflows(New investment 
inflows less disinvestment) as % GDP 
WDI, IMF 
 
 
Table 4.4.: The Correlation matrix for institutional efficiency index 
 Corruption Govteffect Polstab Rule of law 
Govteffect 0.4212    
Polstab 0.2126 0.2839   
Rule of law 0.2423 0.3355 0.2066  
Regquality 0.5488 0.7198 0.2895 0.3193 
Note: All correlations reported relate to averages for the entire period 1970-2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
CHAPTER 05 
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS ON NATIONAL 
EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA) 
5.1: Introduction 
Trade openness is regarded among the most crucial factors for stimulating growth, see 
country level evidence for the trade growth relationship in Edwards (1998), Harrison and Hanson 
(1999), Frankel and Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2003).  Trade is beneficial for growth 
as it enhances both static and dynamic gains. The former group includes the reallocation of scarce 
resources towards more productive activities, which in turn improves welfare and country’s 
overall level of efficiency. As dynamic trade gains are mainly highlighted the existence of 
learning effects and knowledge spillovers. This type of gains mainly impact on domestic 
economic efficiency27 due to positive externalities generated from contacts with international best 
practices. Ina Sub-Sahara African context, the expansion of productive capacity through trade is 
of vital importance given the limited capabilities and the status of underdevelopment in these 
countries (Rodriguez and Rodrick, 2000; Johnson et al., 2010; Vogel and Wagner, 2010). 
Additionally, trade and export in particular provide to these countries the potential of market 
expansion, especially when the domestic economic environment is so heavily distorted (i.e. a 
large number of trade restrictions) and with weak purchasing power (World Bank, 2011).28 
                                                          
27 For example, see firm level studies for the export-efficiency nexus in Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Bernard and 
Wagner, 2004; Bigsten et al., 2000 and Kraay, 2002. This evidence shows that export orientation of firms further 
contributes to firm’s productivity growth. 
28The World Bank report s reveals that country’s in Sub-Saharan Africa take an average of 33.6days to export and 
39.4days to import and costs of exporting and importing in Sub-Saharan Africa is more than twice that of any OECD 
countries. 
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The role of institutions on growth has been extensively investigated in the growth literature 
with the results to suggest the importance of good quality institutions for the long term growth of 
developing nations (Rodrik, 2004). A voluminous number of studies show that institutions have a 
substantial effect on per capita income and economic development (North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 
1999; Easterly and Levine, 2001; Cavalcanti, Magalhaes and Tavares, 2007). Indicatively, 
Acemoglu, Gallego, and Robinson (2014) have concluded that institutional quality account for as 
much as 75% of the variation in income levels around the world. The main message from these 
studies is that countries with better institutions not only invest more in physical and human 
capital (Cavalcanti and Novo, 2005; Daniele and Marani, 2005), but also tend to use these factors 
more efficiently. The elaboration of institutions in this strand of literature has been mainly 
implemented within the framework of growth regressions, which can provide intuitive results 
nevertheless this approach is subject to some empirical limitations. We refine this approach to 
incorporate institutions within a stochastic frontier analysis, which seeks to identify not only if 
better institutional performance can generate higher income, but more importantly, whether 
institutions can affect country’s distance from the frontier. This approach overcomes certain 
difficulties encountered when one models institutions as factors of a standard growth framework 
(Madden et al., 2001; Madsen et. al., 2010)29, as it permits to assess the role of institutions in a 
country’s attempt to achieve optimal production given the amount of inputs available. This is the 
concept of technical efficiency on which institutions supposedly play a key role as they largely 
determine the allocation of the limited resources.30 
                                                          
29 The use of SFA allow for the identification of production-unit and time specific efficiency effects. 
30 At the national level, allocative and technical inefficiency can be caused from a composite of factors related to the 
usage of the resources and they all associated with the under-utilisation of productive capacity. Among of the most 
representative factors that lead to inefficiency are institutional failures that almost directly impact on the efficient use 
of labour and capital. Our analytical framework endeavours to identify the sources that can potentially reduce the 
loss of national income due to inefficiencies (i.e. better quality institutions, more trade orientation, human capital and 
FDI). 
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Endogenous theories of economic growth have attributed to human capital and FDI 
important roles in the growth process31. The accumulation of human capital as measured by the 
average years of schooling or the share of employment with a University degree can increase 
innovation rate as well as can improve absorptive capacity with more effective utilisation of 
technological advancements already produced elsewhere. The social return to education is large 
highlighting primarily the existence of numerous positive externalities; which collectively 
contributes to higher levels of income per capita. In a similar line of argument, FDI is another 
way path to improve physical capital deepening, which is regarded as one of the main drivers of 
output per worker in the Solow model. In addition to this, foreign investment is a conduit of 
technology and knowledge transfer. As already discussed in the present thesis, foreign owned 
firms may possess better management techniques and more advanced know-how from which 
domestic producers can learn in order to improve their own performance. Following the previous 
discussion, human capital and FDI recognised as central factors to our analysis in determining a 
country’s position relative to the frontier.  
The effectiveness of human capital, trade and FDI vastly depends on the existing 
institutional set-up. For instance, the quality, of education provided in Sub-Saharan African 
countries is inseparable from the strength of property rights in the region. Firms might not have 
strong incentives to invest in training and education of their personnel without the existence of 
strong property rights legislation environment. Therefore, there might be members of the labour 
force that have attained the typical skills, although their real job competencies might be weak 
without improving productivity.32 Similarly, there is conditionality in the effectiveness of FDI as 
                                                          
31 See Krueger and Lindahl, 2001for a review about the role of Human capital on the empirics of growth. 
32Obwona, (2004) and Ayanwale, (2007) argued that one of the conditions for location of efficiency-seeking FDI is 
that there is ample supply of skilled labour but noted that although labour appears to be cheap in Africa, there is 
nonetheless an overall shortage of skilled labour on the continent. 
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the indebtedness of the foreign enterprises is analogous to the quality of institutions in the host 
country. In countries without well-functioning institutions or massive political instability, foreign 
investors act opportunistically seeking to reap short-term benefits from from their economic 
activity in the local economy (i.e. exploitation of natural resources, preferential tax treatment 
from a particular government, etc.) without establishing a long term presence in the host country. 
One can easily infer from all previous considerations that the interplay between 
institutions, human capital, trade and FDI is rather crucial and it should not be neglected from the 
efficiency puzzle of less-developed countries. The primary focus of the present chapter is to 
investigate the various institutional channels through which, human capital, trade and FDI can 
maximize performance of SSA countries, which is to decrease inefficiency moving thus the 
country closer to the technical frontier. Our approach is to use a wide range of institutional 
factors, broadly classified as political and economic institutions. The former group includes, for 
example, institutional aspects that represent the level and the quality of democracy while the 
latter group refers to more specific economic factors that can be potentially equally important for 
trade performance and FDI. The set of political institutions is a newly assembled dataset that 
covers virtually the entire SSA countries for the longest possible period 1970-2010 that data can 
be found33. The methodological framework of the study is a panel stochastic frontier for 32 SSA 
countries. 
The contribution of the present chapter to the literature is threefold. First, studies in the 
ternary system of trade, growth and institutions employ simple measures of income per capita, 
which entails a number of inherited endogeneity difficulties before obtaining consistent and 
                                                          
33The data   for political institutions variable are scanty in World Bank, development indicators and so many missing 
variables as such the series were carefully assembled over the past years from different sources (See Appendix  A) 
over a long period of the programme from London School of Economics Library. 
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reliable estimates. An additional issue with this approach is the absence of any identification 
about the way factors of production combined at a given level of technology. This is an efficiency 
issue and can be more appropriately addressed with an SFA approach as it will be implemented 
in this study. Second, this study addresses the issue of conditionality as far as trade, human 
capital and FDI are concerned. It should be misleading to expect that higher levels of education 
or trade orientation will a priori bring more efficiency. This will always depend on the degree of 
institutional quality in the country under consideration. Third, due to data limitations in 
developing countries, studies regarding the source of efficiency is referring mainly to developed 
countries (Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002; Kneller and Stevens, 2003; Henry et al., 2009; Montinari 
and Rochlitz, 2012). 34 The empirical evidence of the present chapter has a clear focus on 
developing nations whose place are by default far behind the international technological frontier. 
Therefore, there is enough space for efficiency improvements and thus great scope to explore the 
mechanism through which improvements can be achieved.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the key characteristics of 
Sub-Saharan African countries and survey key studies in the literature of institutions, trade, 
human capital and growth. Section 3 presents the general theoretical framework. Section 4 
discusses the data set used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 outlines the methodology upon 
which the study is based. The results of the empirical analysis from the frontier are presented in 
Section 6.  The last section contains the concluding remarks. 
 
                                                          
34  Studies on individual case studies for Sub-Saharan African countries include: Harrison (1994) for Cote d’voire, 
Clerides et  al., (1998) for Mexico, Colombia and Morocco,  Bigsten et al, (1999) for Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, Van-Biesebroeck, (2003) for Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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5.2: Survey of the Literature 
There is now considerable evidence that trade liberalization has played a leading role in the 
growth process (Roberts and Tybout (1996), Bernard and Jensen (1999), Alvarez and Lopez 
(2004), Van Biesebroeck (2006) and De Loecker (2007)). It is this empirical finding that is often 
cited as an argument for active export promotion in many developing countries. As already 
mentioned, trade openness is associated with static gains from economies of scale due to market 
expansion. These efficiency gains contribute to better allocation of resources leading to lower 
unemployment and faster growth rates ((Grossman and Helpman 1991, Agosin 1999 and Giles 
and Williams 2000).Mastromarco (2002) and Kneller and Stevens (2006) find that the degree of 
trade openness is positively associated with efficiency in a group of developing countries. On the 
other hand, Fu (2005) within a very similar analytical framework finds no evidence between 
exports and productivity gains in China, highlighting the existence of heavy distortions and the 
presence of market imperfections in the domestic market that hamper any potential gains from 
exporting.   
Several studies have examined the impact of different aspects of institutions or governance on 
economic growth and performance. The general wisdom is that politically stable economies are 
more efficient and grow faster. The mechanisms identified in the literature associate political 
stability and security of property rights with higher investment and growth (Barro (1991, 1996)). 
Other measures of institutional quality include government effectiveness, bureaucratic honesty, 
contract enforcement and rule of law. The use of these indices seek to reveal  whether better 
institutions contribute to grow faster via a more efficient use of the existing resources. The 
evidence is supportive to the positive nexus between growth and institutions (Mauro (1995), 
Knack and Keefer (1997), Rodrik et al. (2004), Kaufmann et al., (2009) and Akinlo (2011)).  
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These findings suggest that cross-country differences in productive efficiency are the results of 
better functioning institutional environment. 
Zhang, Jiang and Wang (2014) find that innovations through technological advancement are 
the primary source of productivity growth through improving products and/or production 
processes. They find evidence that technological advancements may push up the production 
frontier and/or improve efficiency by reducing production costs. This view is supported by 
empirical findings from the endogenous growth model (Romer, 1990; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 
1992 and Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) which assumes a strong knowledge spillover effect from 
innovation through technology. 
Economists are increasingly aware of the deep links between human capital and efficiency 
(Griffith et al., 2004; Kneller and Stevens, 2006; Mastromarco, 2008; Breznitz and Murphree, 
2011; Christopoulos and McAdam 2015) among others, all provide empirical evidence 
supporting the view that a highly skilled economy allows the workforce to implement and absorb 
new technologies and catch up with technological frontier. The extent to which depends on its 
quality, appropriateness and externalities induced by skills. Christopoulos and McAdam (2015) 
argued that human capital may affect efficiency through demonstration, effects, 
complementarities and diffusion process also induced by skills. 
In recent years, developing countries have increasingly relied on private capital as a source of 
funding. Since the early 1990s, private sources of funding have made up over 75% of their extent 
of capital flows (Reiter and Steensma, 2010). The major sources of this private funding have 
consistently been foreign direct investment (FDI). Policy makers believe that FDI is an important 
element in the growth process of developing countries. There are documented empirical evidence 
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on the relationship between FDI and economic growth, however the results vary widely; Bwayla 
(2006) found that there were significant technology spillovers from firms in upstream sectors to 
local firms in the downstream sectors in manufacturing industries in Zambia. Hence FDI can be 
important vehicle for the transfer of technology to certain local firms and for increasing the 
overall competitiveness of the industry, which will have positive effect on economic growth 
(Borenztein et al., 1998). Again it can be argued that, FDI may crowd out local enterprises and 
actually be detrimental to economic growth. Foreign enterprises are often significantly superior to 
domestic enterprises and either buy out or drive out domestic firms, leading to a concentration of 
power in the industry (Blomstrom & kokko, 1996; Aitken & Harrison, 1998; Agosin& Mayer, 
2000). 
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5.3: Model Specification 
This section presents the model specification and the empirical strategy used to analyse the 
determinants of technical inefficiency in SSA countries. The frontier approach was initially 
developed by Farrell (1957) and measures technical inefficiency of production as the distance of 
each production unit to its optimal level. The frontier level of production is defined as the 
maximum level of output that a country can produce given the state of technology and the mix of 
production inputs. The greater the distance from the frontier, the higher is the degree of technical 
inefficiency.Aigner et al. developed (1977)35 a stochastic version of this model and Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) adopted this into a panel context.  The stochastic frontier model is written as: 
 ,, ,(X , , ) i ti t i t t iY f T C e
ε=  (5.1) 
Where Y is real GDP in country i  at year, t , X is vector of standard production inputs currently 
including the following , , ,X [ , , ]i t i t i tK L H=  with K, L, H to denote capital stock, labour and 
human capital. The production function also includes a time trend tT  that captures exogenous 
technical change. The error term of the production function is decomposed as follows: 
 , , ,i t i t i tuε u= −  (5.2) 
The Term ,i tu  represents the standard statistical disturbance of the frontier while ,i tu  is a non-
negative stochastic term that is associated with the technical inefficiency of production in country 
i at year t. ( )f ⋅ is the production frontier that can vary over time and countries, shifts in ( )itf ⋅
overtime reflect technical change. The trade-off in selecting the appropriate empirical 
specification of (5.1) is between alternative a homogenous production function versus a model 
                                                          
35 Applications of SFA can be found in Koop et al., (1999), Kneller and Stevens (2006) and Christopoulos and Leon-
Ledesma (2014). 
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that controls for country heterogeneity. The current specification follows Greene (2005) allowing 
for country fixed effects, attributing to potential inefficiency time-varying factors such as 
political and economic institutions.36 
 Turning to the truncated at zero technical inefficiency term, 0,i tu ≥ , it is assumed to be 
independently distributed with mean, µ and constant variance, 2N ( , )µ σ+ � .  Then, the mean 
level of inefficiency is described as follows: 
 , ,i t i tµ δ= Z  (5.3) 
where ,i tZ is a vector of factors associated with technical inefficiency of production and δ is a 
vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated.37 
We approximate (5.1) with a standard Cobb-Douglass function as follows:38 
 , 0 , , ,ln lni t i j ji t i t i t
j
Y X T uβ β g u= + + + −∑  (5.4) 
With 1,...,i N=  to index countries and j, k=L, K, H to index production inputs. 
 The fixed effects model specified in (5.4) relies on three assumptions: (a) , , ,[ , , ]ji t i t i tX uu are 
mutually uncorrelated (b) the terms ,i tu  and ,i tu  follow normal and half-normal distributions, 
respectively and (c) the inefficiency term u  is time variant. Finally the country heterogeneity is 
captured from 0β .  The time-variant inefficiency term is now modelled as follows: 
                                                          
36 The inefficiency term also includes some other standard covariates that are expected to impact on national 
inefficiency.    
37Battese and Coelli (1995) specify the technical efficiency term defined as: , , ,exp( ) exp( )i t i t i tTE u z δ= − = − . In our 
study we estimate technical inefficiency so results should be interpreted accordingly. 
38 Recent evidence from Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000), Klump et al. (2007) and Leon-Ledesma (2010) reject the 
restrictive Cobb-Douglas function previously used in Lovell et al. (1992) and Bigsten et al. (2000) in favour of more 
flexible forms of production functions. 
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Where 0g  is a constant term, H, is a measure of human capital,
39Trade measures trade openness, 
FDI is the share of inward FDI. The two vectors Political and Economic include political and 
economic institutions, respectively. Finally, we also include a vector ξ with other inefficiency 
determinants such as the share of manufacturing output in GDP and a time trend to capture effort 
and learning by doing effects in national production. Parametersδ  capture the interaction effect 
between institutional variables and human capital, FDI and trade. The term ω  is a stochastic 
random variable distributed as: 20( , )wN σ
+  to satisfy that u is a truncated positive number. 
Parameters g  and δ are to be estimated in a one step process alongside with the estimation of the 
frontier production function (5.4). 
 
 
 
5.3.1: Data Issues 
A Simple Background of Sub-Saharan African Economies  
                                                          
39Christopoulos and Leon-Ledesma (2014) follow a similar modelling strategy including human capital both as a 
production input and as an inefficiency determinant. Our interpretation for including human capital in both (5.4) and 
(5.5) is justified on the basis that we search for synergies between human capital and institutions. 
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Sub-Sahara Africa is mainly specialised in primary commodities. The manufacturing sector in 
SSA is still in its infancy with a limited contribution to the overall economy. The main reason for 
the under-development of the manufacturing sector is the commitment to crude oil exports, 
institutional inefficiencies and lack of finance. The manufacturing sector accounted 9% of GDP 
in SSA in the 1960s and this percentage has slightly increased to 11%, over a period of 30 years 
(Van Biesebroeck, 2005). On the other hand, the manufacturing employment share is relatively 
larger, indicating an issue of low productivity of the sector. Labour costs are low, but not nearly 
as low as in most other emerging markets, and the cost of transport, communication and the 
general standard of living is much higher in SSA than in emerging economies. The major trading 
partner for all SSA countries is Europe; other important partners are Japan, USA and Middle East 
countries. The chances of intra-industry trade in Sub-Sahara are limited due to cross-country 
specialization in very similar products. The lowest degree of product differentiation is mainly 
resulted from the low levels of human capital in the area as well as the low degree and 
technological sophistication in the commodities traded. 
 All SSA countries adopted import substitution development policies from their independence 
through the late 1970s. In the mid to late 1980s, they had all introduced ‘structural adjustment’ 
programs with the support of the World Bank with emphasis on macroeconomic reforms, trade 
liberalization and privatizations.40These reforms did not work well because the basic market 
structure and infrastructure were inadequate or even non-existent to support these reforms. 
Certainly, the absence of quality institutions and good governance is also factors that led to poor 
results from the implementation of market oriented policies and thus fail to promote faster 
economic growth (Collier, 2007; Brixiova and Ndikumana, 2010). 
                                                          
40 The scope and success of these programs varied. For a discussion of policy reforms in these countries see 
Bigstenet al. (199a, 1999b). 
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Definitions of Variables 
This study uses an unbalanced panel of 32 African countries for the period 1970-2010. 
Starting from the variables included in the production function, Output is the real GDP expressed 
in constant 2000 USD, labour input is the number of workers engaged and capital is a measure of 
capital stock expressed in constant 2000 USD.  The study briefly outline the content of each 
variable here, a more detailed description can be found in Appendix Table 5.1. 
Data on GDP per capita and capital stock were taken from World Bank’s Development 
Indicators (WBDI). Data on manufacturing export share and manufacturing, value added as a 
share of GDP are taken from World Bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts 
data files. When gaps in the data were evident in some of the countries; we tried other sources 
such as: the United Nation National Accounts (Main Aggregates Database) and African 
Development Bank (ADB database). We capture absorptive capacity of Sub-Saharan African 
countries using capital stock measured by machinery imports. Imports are conduits that already 
embody foreign knowledge and technological know-how. The use of this variable implies the 
greater the level of imports the greater the scope for absorption of foreign innovations (Henry, 
Kneller and Milner, 2009; Griffith et al., 2005).To capture the degree of domestic imitation, we 
use two variables FDI and human capital. FDI is used instead of innovation data that are not in 
existent for Sub-Saharan countries. FDI data are taken from various issues of the International 
Monetary Fund and International Financial Statistics. Human capital is measured by mean years 
of schooling in the population aged 15 and over is taken from Barro and Lee (2000). Trade 
openness is the share of exports plus imports to GDP (WBDI and ADB databases).  
The study classifies its institutional variables into two parts, political and economic; the 
political variables included are the rule of law, political stability, government effectiveness and 
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corruption. The rule of law captures the extent to which foreign investors have confidence in the 
rules of the country. The political stability measures the likelihood that the government in power 
will be destabilised by unconstitutional means, including domestic violence and terrorism. The 
government effectiveness indicator, indicate the ability of the government to formulate policies 
that are expected to improve countries’ efficiency performance and promote productivity growth 
and corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gains. Data for 
the political, institutional variables for these countries were assembly from various sources over a 
long period of time from the London School of Economics Library. The data sources include 
WDI Various issues, WEO (IMF), ADB data base, UNECA database, World Bank, Doing 
business report various issues, World Economic Forum, Global competition report and PRS 
Group, International Country Risk Guide.  
The economic institutional variables are indices taken from the Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW) (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003). The economic freedom index consists of five main 
components and 42 sub-components that cover various aspects of the economic activity. The 
study considers three of the main economic freedom components making sure these are not 
overlapping with our political institutions variables. Precisely, we use the following indices: (a) 
Size of Government; (b) Sound Money; and (c) Regulations.41. Index (a) represents whether 
government interferes in the economic activity causing distortions in the operation of the private 
sector of the economy, (b) refers to the reliability of the monetary authority in the country and (c) 
measures the degree of market protection and regulation in the economy. These indices are 
ranked from 0-10 with values closer to the upper bound indicating a greater degree of freedom in 
the related area. More detailed definitions of the economic institutional variables can be found in 
                                                          
41There are 24 components in the index. Many of these components are themselves made up of several sub-
components. In total the index comprises 42 distinct variables, each components and sub-components is placed on a 
scale from 0-10 that reflects the distribution of the underlying data. 
117 
 
Appendix Table 5.1.  Appendix Table 5.2 reports the correlation matrix for the variable. As 
shown by the Table, multicollinearity is no longer concern with weakly correlated regressor. 
Table 5.3 presents descriptive statistics of all variables using data for the period (1970-2010). 
Table 5.3: Summary statistics of Key variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation       Minimum Maximum   
LnY 1271                  8.82                 1.38                       5.44                           12.88 
LnL 1271 0.74 1’34 -2.72 3.89 
LnK 1271                 9.87 1.28 6.80 13.75 
LnH 1269 -3.48                 1.99                     -9.19                           2.09   
Rule of Law                    1271                  1.80             1.01                     0.04                            5.73 
Political Stability            1271                  1.79              1.17                    0.008                             5.9 
Gov effectiveness          1271                  1.99 1.27                    0.01 5.87 
Corruption                      1271                  1.98             1.26                      0.01                                   5.90 
FDI   1271                  4.80               7.3                     6.90e-07                                             111.80 
Openness 1271                  -.10    0.19                      -1.58                               0.65
Size 1074 7.81               10.73                     0.21                                     9.7 
Money 421 6.43               1.77                           0 9.6 
Regulations 401 5.99 1.02 3.8 8.8 
Source: World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI), International Country Risk Guide, World Bank, Worldwide 
Governance indicators, International Country Risk Guide, World Economic forum, Global Competitiveness Report 
and Economic Freedom of the World Annual report. 
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5.4: Econometric Estimation and Results from SFA 
Results from the estimation of the production and inefficiency functions are shown in Table 
5.7. Before proceeding with the various empirical specifications; we need to report some key 
features and diagnostics of the stochastic frontier model. Remember SFA allows distinguishing 
among the following components: technical progress, technical efficiency, and a stochastic 
component of TFP (Benhabib and Spigel (1994) and (1997)). 42 Using this decomposition we can 
obtain a measure of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. First, the production function is 
subject to constant returns to scale (CRS) and all estimated coefficients of inputs represent shares, 
second the coefficient of the time trend in the production function stands for exogenous 
technological progress and third the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as 
the sum of exogenous technical progress plus the growth rate of technical efficiency (TE). These 
are summarised as follows:  
1. Input shares, ln
ln j
Y
X
∂
∂
 with CRS:
3
1
1ln
lnj j
Y
X=
∂
=
∂∑  
2. Exogenous technical progress, lnYTP
t
∂
=
∂
 
3. 
TFP TETP
TFP TE
• •
≡ + , where technical efficiency is computed as: 
t
µ∂
∂
 with µ  to represent the 
mean level of technical efficiency as defined in (5.3). 
                                                          
42In growth regression methods of productivity-efficiency estimation, the distinction allowed in SFA is neglected 
(Koop et al., (1999, 2000), Madden et al., (2001), Wang (2007) and Madsen et al., (2010)). In growth accounting 
measures (parametric and non-parametric), a production function is specified with identically and independently 
distributed error terms nevertheless, at the second stage the residual term is assumed to be a function of a number of 
variables which can be directly entered into the production function  as inputs, thus being correlated with explanatory 
variables. In this case, the assumption of identically distributed inefficiency terms does not hold anymore.  
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4. Parameter
2
2 2
u
u u
σ
λ
σ σ
=
+
. This determines whether variation in output is due to noise, 
0λ →   or distance from the frontier, 1λ →  
The maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for λ  are reported in the lower section of Table 5.4 
Values are quite high apart from the first specification indicating that a high proportion of the 
composite error term in the production function is attributable to inefficiencies. In principle, this 
signifies that large variations in output can be explained by technical inefficiency and thus from 
factors that can potentially explain inefficiency, such as institutions. Similarly, the level of 
technical efficiency across Tables 5.4-5.6 presented in this section indicate that there is a gap 
from the frontier due to inefficiency that sometimes can reach to almost 50%. These scores of 
technical efficiency are relatively lower than those found in advanced economies (Christopoulos 
and Ledesma, 2014). TFP growth rates are also reported based on calculation of formula 4 above. 
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Table 5.4: Institutions and Human Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Frontier 
lnL 0.422*** 0.430** 0.439** 0.410** 0.437** 
 (2.60) (2.51) (2.49) (2.26) (2.45) 
lnK 0.521*** 0.512*** 0.503*** 0.454*** 0.490*** 
 (3.34) (3.11) (2.97) (2.61) (2.87) 
lnH 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.136*** 0.074 
 (1.23) (1.19) (1.16) (2.65) (1.46) 
T 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
 (10.43) (10.56) (8.52) (8.77) (8.51) 
Inefficiency Equation 
Political Institutions 
Rule -0.231 0.571 -0.129 -0.171 -0.170 
 (-1.47) (1.05) (-0.86) (-1.19) (-1.15) 
Pol_stability -0.433*** -0.272** 0.389 -0.305** -0.168 
 (-3.08) (-2.12) (0.83) (-2.38) (-1.29) 
Gov_effect -0.187 -0.104 -0.331** 0.301 -0.200 
 (-1.41) (-0.84) (-2.53) (0.64) (-1.56) 
Corruption -0.347*** -0.361*** -0.005 -0.302** 0.346 
 (-2.67) (-2.95) (-0.04) (-2.47) (0.67) 
H -0.002 0.461 0.746 0.494 0.548 
 (-0.00) (0.64) (1.01) (0.66) (0.71) 
FDI -0.048* -0.036 -0.066** -0.044* -0.041* 
 (-1.81) (-1.60) (-2.52) (-1.95) (-1.72) 
Openness 2.343 2.778* 3.634** 3.383** 3.019* 
 (1.39) (1.82) (2.23) (2.19) (1.91) 
Political Institutions with Human Capital 
H×rule  -0.576*    
  (-1.80)    
H×pol_stability   -0.451*   
   (-1.77)   
H×gov_effect    -0.400  
    (-1.47)  
H×corruption     -0.409 
     (-1.35) 
Economic Institutions 
Size -0.161** -0.210*** -0.171** -0.207*** -0.185** 
 (-2.21) (-3.05) (-2.31) (-2.97) (-2.57) 
Money 0.073 0.073 0.300*** 0.106 0.226** 
 (0.81) (0.86) (3.23) (1.23) (2.53) 
Regulation 0.208* 0.257** 0.243** 0.245** 0.206* 
 (1.75) (2.28) (2.02) (2.17) (1.76) 
Man_share -0.096*** -0.069** -0.054* -0.080*** -0.040 
 (-3.16) (-2.48) (-1.78) (-2.92) (-1.43) 
Effort -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.130*** -0.044*** -0.104*** 
121 
 
 (-3.26) (-3.47) (-9.33) (-3.61) (-7.91) 
N 881 881 881 881 881 
TE 0.773 0.691 0.757 0.744 0.742 
TFP 0.019 0.042 0.029 0.052 0.035 
2
uσ  1.114 1.162 1.194 1.240 1.208 
2
uσ  0.345 0.649 1.086 0.707 0.897 
Λ 0.310 0.559 0.910 0.570 0.743 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses with *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
Table 5.5: Institutions, FDI and Trade Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Frontier         
lnL 0.329 0.326 0.399* 0.319 0.455**
* 
0.417** 0.467**
* 
0.276*** 
 (1.37) (1.38) (1.75) (1.31) (2.94) (2.48) (3.49) (16.29) 
lnK 0.405* 0.459** 0.471** 0.449* 0.541**
* 
0.543**
* 
0.557**
* 
0.524*** 
 (1.75) (2.02) (2.15) (1.93) (3.63) (3.36) (4.32) (26.71) 
lnH 0.267**
* 
0.215*** 0.130** 0.232**
* 
0.003 0.040 -0.024 0.200*** 
 (3.93) (3.22) (2.02) (3.39) (0.07) (0.85) (-0.63) (16.16) 
T 0.006 0.005 0.017*** 0.003 0.037**
* 
0.031**
* 
0.038**
* 
0.007*** 
 (1.17) (1.09) (3.61) (0.57) (11.48) (8.92) (13.02) (4.42) 
Inefficiency Equation 
Political Institutions 
Rule_La 1.534**
* 
-0.504 0.296 -
2.100** 
0.200 -0.183 -0.154 47.777 
 (4.12) (-1.57) (1.38) (-2.35) (1.07) (-1.32) (-0.99) (.) 
Pol_Stability -0.134 1.652*** -0.171 0.967 -
0.381**
* 
-0.004 -
0.349** 
-29.241 
 (-0.50) (3.40) (-0.84) (1.06) (-2.84) (-0.03) (-2.51) (.) 
Gov_Effect 0.196 0.009 1.075*** -
5.157**
* 
-0.175 -0.233* -0.054 -44.014 
 (0.77) (0.03) (4.22) (-3.42) (-1.36) (-1.92) (-0.35) (.) 
Corruption -
0.553** 
0.398 -0.410** 1.497 -
0.249** 
-
0.241** 
-
0.273** 
28.284 
 (-2.29) (1.27) (-2.13) (1.20) (-1.97) (-2.03) (-2.04) (.) 
H 0.219 0.943 0.258 0.950 -0.025 -0.014 -0.148 -11.841 
 (0.26) (0.82) (0.38) (0.29) (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.33) (.) 
FDI 0.667**
* 
1.121*** 0.664*** 1.043 -0.045* -0.042* -0.049* -
5.361*** 
 (4.43) (4.65) (5.52) (1.33) (-1.78) (-1.84) (-1.76) (-4.00) 
Openness 4.269 20.205* 14.696* 13.743 -3.928 -2.218 -1.585 5.790 
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** ** 
 (1.45) (5.95) (6.21) (1.27) (-1.43) (-0.97) (-0.55) (.) 
Political Institutions with FDI and Trade Openness 
FDI×Rule -
0.298**
* 
       
 (-5.78)        
Trade×Rule     4.162**
* 
   
     (2.77)    
FDI×Pol_Stabilit
y 
 -
0.378*** 
      
  (-6.14)       
Trade×Pol_Stabil
ity 
     2.481**   
      (2.17)   
FDI×Gov_Effect   -
0.278*** 
     
   (-6.72)      
Trade×Gov_Effec
t 
      1.908  
       (1.46)  
FDI×Corruption    -0.345*     
    (-1.76)     
Trade×Corruption        11.719*
* 
        (2.26) 
Economic Institutions 
Size -
0.461**
* 
-
0.442*** 
-
0.322*** 
0.654 -
0.145** 
-
0.165** 
-0.134* -
6.490*** 
 (-3.29) (-2.61) (-3.02) (1.09) (-2.03) (-2.42) (-1.77) (-4.51) 
Money 0.356** 0.741*** 0.457*** 0.955 0.128 0.111 0.083 -9.394 
 (2.38) (3.93) (3.70) (1.59) (1.45) (1.33) (0.90) (.) 
Regulation 0.702**
* 
0.737*** 0.504*** 0.843 0.221* 0.205* 0.171 10.314*
** 
 (3.14) (2.68) (2.93) (0.80) (1.89) (1.85) (1.38) (7.27) 
Man_share -
0.154**
* 
-
0.230*** 
-
0.161*** 
0.348 -
0.071** 
-0.050* -
0.062** 
9.902*** 
 (-3.01) (-3.43) (-3.80) (1.25) (-2.50) (-1.86) (-2.06) (12.58) 
Effort -0.036 -0.032 0.001 0.415**
* 
-
0.081**
* 
-
0.053**
* 
-
0.067**
* 
-
10.813*
** 
 (-1.50) (-1.09) (0.04) (2.92) (-5.94) (-4.36) (-4.47) (-27.12) 
N 881 881 881 881 881 881 881 883 
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TE 0.600 0.504 0.560 0.588 0.563 0.603 0.778 0.901 
TFP 0.01 0.004 0.015 0.004 0.035 0.031 0.051 0.001 
2
uσ  1.634 1.597 1.532 1.637 1.044 1.131 0.902 0.418 
2
uσ  1.700 1.890 1.960 2.350 3.800 3.550 3.550 3.470 
Λ 0.510 0.542 0.561 0.589 0.784 0.758 0.797 0.892 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
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Table 5.6: Economic Institutions and Trade Openness 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Frontier  
lnL 0.321 0.386* 0.354 
 (1.44) (1.81) (1.54) 
lnK 0.409* 0.449** 0.415* 
 (1.90) (2.19) (1.88) 
lnH 0.269*** 0.164*** 0.232*** 
 (4.27) (2.73) (3.58) 
T 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.010** 
 (4.11) (4.14) (2.18) 
Inefficiency Equation 
Political Institutions 
rule  -0.309* -0.208 -0.258 
 (-1.65) (-1.23) (-1.44) 
pol_stability -0.078 -0.190 -0.540*** 
 (-0.47) (-1.31) (-3.39) 
gov_effect -0.429** -0.451*** -0.444*** 
 (-2.53) (-3.02) (-2.75) 
Corruption -0.217 -0.222 -0.405*** 
 (-1.37) (-1.58) (-2.62) 
H 0.969 0.646 0.452 
 (1.50) (1.24) (0.79) 
FDI 0.052 0.033 0.066* 
 (1.55) (1.18) (1.89) 
Openness 3.641* 2.659 3.305 
 (1.92) (1.50) (1.64) 
Economic Institutions 
Size -0.011 0.068 0.550*** 
 (-0.11) (0.82) (3.25) 
Money 1.160*** 0.542*** 0.512*** 
 (4.68) (4.28) (3.69) 
Regulation 0.304** 0.637*** 0.562*** 
 (1.96) (3.52) (3.67) 
Economic Institutions with Trade Openness 
Openness×Money -0.192***   
 (-5.94)   
Openness×Regulation  -0.198***  
  (-7.42)  
Openness×Size    -0.201*** 
   (-6.61) 
Man_Share -0.032 -0.019 -0.075** 
 (-0.91) (-0.61) (-2.20) 
Effort -0.106*** -0.062*** -0.050*** 
 (-6.22) (-4.27) (-3.15) 
N 881 881 881 
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TE 0.628 0.645 0.651 
TFP  0.018 0.024 0.020 
2
uσ  1.529 1.453 1.570 
2
uσ  44.563 4.065 8345.255 
Λ 0.967 0.737 0.9998 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
5.5:  Discussion 
Technical Efficiency 
Appendix Table 5.7 presents average technical efficiency scores for all Sub-Saharan African 
countries over the period 1970-2010. There is evidence of substantial variation in efficiency 
levels across countries in this African region. The highest efficiency sore is found in countries 
located in the Southern part of Africa. (e.g. Swaziland, Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho, Nambia,   Mauritius, Botswana, and Namibia) than West Africa (e.g. Benin, Burkina-
Faso, Coted’voire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo) and Eastern Africa countries 
(e.g. Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda).  
 Some preliminary remarks are in order to explain why performance of the Southern-part of SSA 
is superior. First, many of these economics have adopted open trade policies, which brought 
export success in primary commodity industries such as: sugar, textiles and apparel. The pattern 
found in our study is consistent with findings in Sachs and Warner (1997). Second, countries in 
the southern part of SSA have no substantial mineral resources, which necessitated a significant 
investment in human capital as well as the design of export oriented policies as paths of 
economic development. Third, countries located to the south of SSA tend to be more democratic, 
which might be another part of the puzzle that explains why they persistently perform better. 
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Production 
Regarding estimates of factor inputs across tables 5.4-5.5, labour and capital are positive and 
statistically significant, as expected. The estimated coefficient of human capital is sometimes 
insignificant reflecting more likely the low human capital intensity of these countries or the lack 
of an appropriate institutional environment that human capital can be utilised. These estimates 
follow a similar pattern with other studies adopting an SFA model in countries with a similar 
level of development (Henry et al., 2009; Saliola andSeker, 2011; Christopoulos and McAdam, 
2015). The estimation of time trend is positive and statistically significant in almost all 
specifications indicating that there is substantial technical progress that occurred over this long 
period of 40 years. Finally, the parameter Λ tends to be above 0.5 in almost all specifications 
presented confirming that most large proportion in the variation of output is mainly due to 
technical efficiency. 
Institutions  
Turning to the inefficiency equations, a negative estimated coefficient indicates that the variable 
is a positive determinant of the catching up process towards the frontier thus contributes to a 
decrease in inefficiency. The autonomous coefficients of political institutions (rule of law, 
political stability, government effectiveness, and corruption) in Table 5.4 are almost always 
negative though the level of statistically significance is not always strong. The institutions with 
the most robust pattern in terms of statistical significance in Table 5.4 are political and corruption. 
The negative and significant estimate of political stability suggests that a more stable political 
framework increases business confidence thus stimulating economic activity. In a more stable 
political environment trade and investment are strongly encouraged, improving the degree of 
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technical efficiency in national production. The existence of corruption is associated with high 
transaction costs in economic activities, which prevent an efficient allocation of resources and 
even more importantly destroys any entrepreneurial initiative. Our results are consistent with 
Meon and Weill (2008) and Danquah and Quattara (2015), who found that high degree of 
political stability and minimal corruption, always bring national efficiency. 
The results of economic institutions variables in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that government size is 
among the most crucial factors of reducing the level of national inefficiency. The coefficient of 
the size of government is negative and statistical significance in the 5% level and above in all 
specifications of Table 5.4 while it is negative and significant in seven out of eight specifications 
in Table 5.5. The main message behind this result is that the less government intervention in the 
economy in terms of consumption, taxation and implementation of transfers and subsidies the 
higher the degree of efficiency. These results imply that the government and more generally 
public administration in SSA are very likely to be the sources of corruption so their role should 
be minimal when functioning in the economy in order to keep levels of efficiency. Unlike 
government size, sound money index is found to be positive in almost all specifications in Table 
5.4 and 5.5 even though the level of significance is not always strong in conventional levels. The 
positive sign represents the necessity of money supply as a means of capturing all potential gains 
from trade and exchange. High values of this index indicate low inflation and monetary policy 
that is not used to finance public expenditure. Nevertheless, the financial system in SSA is 
already under-developed without the presence of many alternative financial capital markets so the 
lack of appropriate intervention from country’s monetary authority can lead to insufficient money 
supply in the economy that potentially restricts economic activity causing inefficiency.. 
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Finally, regulation has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all specifications in 
Table 5.4 and 5.5. Regulation is a composite index that accounts for the degree of economic 
freedom in three different areas, credit market, labour market and business environment. For SSA 
countries, the regulation index is constructed using information mainly from credit market as the 
other two aspects consist of too many missing values. This indicates that liberalisation in the 
domestic credit market in SSA countries has not brought substantial efficiency gains mainly due 
to the fact that free market functions are not yet well developed to generate strong mechanisms 
that will ensure efficient allocation of financial resources.  Although market liberalisation has 
removed restrictions on import quantities  and import tariffs, the dysfunctions of the credit 
market has not allowed traditional export sectors in SSA to exploit benefits from international 
activities thus overweighing the overall gains from trade and liberalisation. 
Institutions and Human Capital 
The result of the interaction of Human capital and political institutions as presented in Table 5.4 
enhanced efficiency. The most striking feature of this result is that the interaction of the political 
institution variables with human capital enhances efficiency for all four variables, the rule of law, 
political stability, government effectiveness and corruption. Our findings indicate that most 
governments in these countries believe the presence of political stability and strict adherence to 
rule of law is the key element in the institutional environment that shapes human capital 
development and improves output per worker. Again, a highly democratic regime is associated 
with better maintenance of the rule of law (Barro, 1996. 1999), which in turn incorporates a better 
protection, and enforcement of intellectual property rights and a more rigorous regulation of 
product safety. Finally, the results also show that improvements in the quality and efficiency of 
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institutions would reduce the level of inefficiency. It points to a strong impact of quality of 
institutions on efficient performance in SSA. 
Institutions and FDI  
Our emphasis in Table 5.5 will be on the interaction terms. The interactions of political 
institution variables with FDI reduce inefficiency for all the four variables, the rule of law, 
political stability, government effectiveness and corruption. The importance of this source of 
external finance is evident in the efforts by many SSA to attract FDI through the adoption of 
FDI-friendly policies, adherence to rule of and maintenance of stable government. Institutions 
were recognised as important determinants not only of cross-country differences in wealth and 
development (Acemoglu& Johnson, 2005), but also of cross-country differences in FDI (Dunning 
&Lundan, 2008; Pedersen, 2010), they argued that foreign investors have become increasingly 
aware of the importance of the institutional quality as they make their investment decisions. The 
continent is abundant in mineral resources, but still attracts only a small percentage of FDI 
flowing into the developing countries. In 2009, for example, the FDI flows to developing 
countries amounted to $478.35 billion, in which the share of the whole of Africa was a mere 
$58.57 billion, representing just 12.2%. (UNCTAD, 2010) Essentially, the lack of infrastructure, 
institutional policies and political instability are often readily cited, as hindering the flow of 
foreign investment into the continent compare with other developing economies. However, with 
the recent improvement in the business climate in the region, most countries have been able to 
attract more FDI than before. For instance, FDI flows to African countries increased by 5 percent 
to in 2012 even as global FDI fell by 18 percent (UNCTAD, 2013). 
SSA countries that manage to improve their social infrastructure via better governance and high 
quality institutions also attract more foreign investors making FDI the main engine of growth and 
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development. These results are in harmony with findings of Hall and Jones, 1999 and Acemoglu 
et al. 2005 regarding the role of institutions on growth of income per capita. 
  Institutions and Trade Openness 
Our results for trade openness confront prior evidence (Kneller and Stevens, 2006; Mastromarco, 
2002) that open countries are more efficient. The interaction of trade openness with political 
institutions does not provide the expected negative sign in Table 5.5. This finding may well be 
consistent with the view that the level of trade in SSA is very low, and therefore restricts the 
region’s ability to capitalise on technical efficiency gains from trade. The low level of trade with 
continuous disruption of production due to strikes and insurgencies in some of the regions limits 
the absorptive capacity, in so doing, hampering the diffusion of technological improvements and 
national efficiency scores. In a further test of robustness we investigate whether different type of 
institutions matter for the exploitation of trade gains. Estimates of interaction variables between   
trade openness with economic institutions, sound money, regulations, and government size 
improves efficiency are shown in Table 5.6. Coefficients of all interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. These results suggest that the synergies in an economic 
environment between trade orientation and low government intervention, stable monetary policy 
and a liberalised market environment can lead to substantial benefits in technical efficiency. In 
other words transfer of technology through trade depends on the degree of economic freedom in 
the economy. A less distorted economic environment domestically increases the potential for 
trade associated gains. This result is consistent with those of Griffith et al., (2004), Kneller 
(2005), and Iyer et al.,(2008) for OECD countries; and (Mastromarco and Ghosh, 2008 and 
Henry et al. 2009) for developing countries. 
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5.6: Conclusion 
In a stochastic frontier framework, we examine technical efficiency in Sub-Saharan African 
countries and the role played by political and economic institution, both in determining the 
position of the frontier and in explaining deviations from the frontier. We found notable 
differences across SSA countries. These differences are important in understanding growth 
patterns and productivity in these countries which depend to a large extent on political instability 
and poor policies. Therefore, Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor economic performance (slow growth 
and aggregate technical inefficiency) can be in part attributed to bad governance.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study using a stochastic frontier approach for the entire 
group of Sub-Saharan African countries for the longest possible time span (1970-2010). Previous 
studies have considered either the developed or medium-sized, with less restriction. 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries are therefore more likely than those in the other regions to reap 
efficiency gains from trade openness, increase access to foreign capital via foreign direct 
investment, investments to promote the quality of education and better quality political and 
economic institutions. From our results, we found that moving towards the production frontier 
depend upon the market environment and the political and economic institutions of these 
countries. Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially exploit substantial gains as moving 
towards higher levels of trade orientation and its manufacturing specialisation. The frontier 
analysis has also shown the existences of large inefficiencies in the entire sector of most countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries that failed to grow have suffered (e.g., Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Madagascar, Sierra-Leone and Mali) high technical inefficiencies. 
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Our results have important policy implications for sustainable economic development in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Development strategy in the future should centre on productivity-enhancing 
growth. First, technical inefficiencies have significantly retarded GDP per capita growth, which 
nevertheless suggests ample room for productivity growth through efficiency improvement. 
Inefficiencies are mainly caused by misallocation of investment, excessive production capacity 
and the politicized system of rewards. Second, this study suggests that, in addition to purely 
economic institutions (e.g. trade openness, government size, sound money, regulations); political 
institutions play a key role in Sub-Saharan African countries efficiency profiles and productivity 
growth. Policy makers should therefore attempt to improve this key determinant of technical 
frontier. 
The governments of these countries should loosen administrative burdens for trade so that it 
is easier for manufacturers to export their products and import capital goods. The high cost of 
importing and exporting, along with lengthy time delays and cumbersome administrative process, 
makes it difficult for Sub-Saharan African enterprises to increase trade volumes and discourages 
them from expanding their productive base. 
 Finally, most governments in these regions (Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and a host of 
others) have set up agencies to fight corruption such as the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commissions (ICPC), with a sole 
mandate to fight corruption is a step in the right direction to improve efficiency. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table 5.1: List of Variables, Description and Data Source 
Variable Description Source 
GDP per capita Real Gross Domestic product per 
Capita in 2000US$ constant prices 
World Development indicators 
(WDI) 
Manufactures Exports Manufactured goods exports in 
constant US$ 
World Bank national accounts 
and OECD national accounts, 
UNECA and ADB database 
Exports’ share in 
Manufacturing(X/Y) 
Exports of goods and services as % to 
GDP 
WDI, OECD, UNECA and 
ADB database 
Manufacturing Value 
added 
 
Manufacturing Value added is the net 
output of all sectors after adding up 
all outputs and subtracting all 
intermediate inputs 
World Bank national accounts 
and OECD national accounts, 
UNECA and ADB database 
 Manufacturing VA 
(%GDP) 
Manufacturing value added as % to 
GDP 
WDI, IMF, OECD, UNECA 
and ADB database 
Employment  Labour force share in Manufacturing 
sector. (Number of Manufacturing 
workers). 
Barro&Lee,  WDI and OECD 
national accounts, UNECA 
and ADB database 
Capital stock Machinery imports. World Bank’s Development 
Indicators and ADB database 
FDI The weighted average net inflows 
(new investment inflows less 
disinvestment) as %to GDP. 
IMF, World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) 
Rule of law This variable is intended to capture 
the extent to which foreign agents 
have confidence in the rules of the 
country. It is scaled from 0 to 6, with 
0 reflecting the lowest incidence of 
the rule of law and 6 reflecting the 
highest. 
WDI, WEO(IMF), ADB (Data 
Base) and UNECA (Data 
Base),  Doing business report, 
World Economic Forum, 
Global competitiveness report 
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Political Stability Measure the likelihood that 
government will be destabilised or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means including domestic 
violence or terrorism. The index 
ranges from a scale of 0 (less 
democratic) to 6 (strongly 
democratic). 
WDI, WEO(IMF), (various 
issues), ADB (Data Base) and 
UNECA (Data Base) World 
Bank, Doing business report, 
World Economic Forum, 
Global competitiveness report 
Government 
effectiveness 
Measure the quality of public 
services, the quality of policy 
formulation and the credibility of the 
governments’ commitment to such 
policies. It is scaled from 0-6 low 
scores indicate less government 
effectiveness and high scores indicate 
better quality of governance. 
WDI (various issues), 
WEO(IMF), (various issues), 
ADB (Data Base) and 
UNECA (Data Base),World 
Bank, Doing business report, 
World Economic Forum, 
Global competitiveness report 
Corruption Measure the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gains 
and the capture of the states by elites 
and private interest. 
WDI, WEO, ADB (Data Base) 
and UNECA (Data Base),  
World Economic Forum, 
Global competitiveness report 
Human Capital % of population  with  Secondary 
Education as the highest level 
attained 
IMF, WDI, UNCTAD 
Openness to trade (T) 
(X+M)/Y 
This is calculated as the ratio of 
exports plus imports over Real GDP. 
WDI&  ADB database 
Size of Government This measures the extent to which 
countries rely on the political process 
to allocate resources and goods and 
services. When government spending 
increases relative to spending by 
individuals, household and business, 
government decision making are 
substituted for personal choice and 
economic freedom is reduced. The 
rating is from 0-10; A high rating 
indicates a greater degree of 
Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW, 2014 
REPORT). 
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economic freedom 
Sound Money Measures the extent to which 
government finances their 
expenditures by creating money, in 
effect, they are expropriating the 
property and violating the economic 
freedom of their citizen. The rating is 
from 0-10; A high rating indicates a 
greater degree of economic freedom 
Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW, 2003; 2014 
REPORT). 
Regulation Measures the extent to which 
restrictions into markets, interfere 
with the freedom to exchange in 
voluntary exchange, they reduce 
economic freedom. The rating is 
from 0-10; A high rating indicates a 
greater degree of economic freedom 
Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW, 2003; 2014 
REPORT). 
 
Table 5.2:  Correlation Matrix 
 HC Open FDI Rule POLS GOVT Corrupt Size Money 
Open 0.11         
FDI -0.03 0.04        
Rule -0.03 -0.04 -0.05       
Polstab 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.43      
Govt -0.09 -0.9 -0.08 0.42 0.40     
Corrupt -0.04 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.29    
Size 0.08 0.10 0.07 -0.15 -0.08 -0.22 -0.09   
Money 0.03 0.21 0.16 -0.01 0.19 0.09 0.21 0.20  
Reg 0.31 0.38 0.17 -0.10 0.09 -0.06 0.20 0.24 0.45 
Note: All correlations reported relate to averages for the entire period 1970-2010. 
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Table 5.7: Technical Efficiency Levels in Descending Order  
Country Technical Efficiency 
Swaziland 0.995056 
Botswana 0.827369 
South Africa 0.819459 
Zimbabwe 0.767467 
Lesotho 0.751106 
Namibia 0.740977 
Mauritius 0.738947 
Mozambique 0.721697 
Gambia 0.716206 
Cameroon 0.715055 
Benin 0.713044 
Central African 0.711966 
Kenya 0.706614 
Zambia         0.704203 
Niger 0.701111 
Burundi 0.696943 
Mauritania 0.682425 
Comoros 0.676052 
Nigeria 0.675339 
Burkina Faso 0.670404 
Ghana 0.668593 
Cote d' Ivoire 0.667538 
Guinea-Bissau 0.665435 
Togo 0.663504 
Senegal 0.661899 
Malawi 0.644375 
Mali 0.640575 
Sierra-Leone 0.633474 
Madagascar 0.631766 
Rwanda 0.624274 
Ethiopia 0.618938 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Before concluding the thesis, I would like to state that the analysis of the divergent development 
paths of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries is equally important in understanding their growth 
process. The chief concern of this section has been to apply some analytical thinking to empirical 
literature on institutions and growth. Some scholars argue that the possibilities of SSA 
development have been constrained by the lingering effects of the extractive and patrimonial 
institutions enacted in the region during the colonial period (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001a).  Glaeser et al. (2004) observe that most indicators of institutional quality 
used to establish the propositions that institutions cause growth are constructed to conceptually 
unsuitable for that purpose. The heart of their critique points to the fact that these indicators are 
not measuring institutions as constraints (which is the key claim of the theoretical literature on 
institutions), but are actually measuring institutional outcomes or performance. The study argued 
that, these governance indicators are too volatile to reflect more or less permanent features of the 
political environment and tend to rise with per capita income.  
This thesis can be contested by arguing that a great deal of variation in terms of economic and 
political outcomes has been actually observed in the region, both across countries and time. It can 
also be pointed out that the history of SSA levels of inequality (the highest in the world) has their 
roots in the economic and political structures of the colonial past. We illustrate this by discussing 
the case of Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Sierra-Leone and Togo to buttress our empirical 
argument in explaining why performance of the Southern part is Superior. 
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Botswana 
Botswana has had the highest rate of per capita growth of any country in the world in the last 
35years (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). This occurred despite that, Botswana did not 
start out with favourable initial conditions at independence in 1966. When the British left, there 
were 12 kilometres of paved road, 22 Batswana who had graduated from University and 100 
from Secondary School.43 Botswana is a predominantly tropical, landlocked country surrounded 
to the south by the Republic of South Africa, to the west and north by Nambia, and to the east by 
Zimbabwe. It comprises 220,000 square miles (570,000 square kilometers) about the size of 
France, Kenya or Texas. The environment is mostly arid and 84% of the country is sand, only 4% 
of all the land can be easily cultivated (which many economists see as a disadvantage, e.g., 
Bloom and Sachs, 1998). 
There is almost complete agreement that Botswana achieved this spectacular growth performance 
because of good institutions, which we refer to as institutions of private property. Despite the 
large revenues from diamonds, this has not induced domestic political instability or conflict for 
control of these resources, contrary to other African countries with abundant natural resources 
such as Nigeria, Burundi, Sierra-Leone, Zambia, Ethiopia, etc. The basic system of law and 
contract worked reasonably well. The government sustained the minimal public service structure 
that that it inherited from the British and developed it into a meritocratic, relatively non-corrupt 
and efficient bureaucracy.  
                                                          
43 There was no university in Botswana at independence and most of those who acquired even a secondary 
education were the children of chiefs who attended schools for Africans in South Africa such as the famous Fort 
Hare College where Nelson Mandela also studied. 
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Botswana’s greatest strengths are its relatively reliable and transparent institutions, efficient 
government spending, low levels of corruption and its adoption of investors’ friendly policies. 
These policies resulted from an underlying set of institutions- institutions of private property-that 
encouraged investment and economic investment and economic development. Botswana’s 
institutions of private property reflect a combination of factors: 
• Botswana possessed pre-colonial tribal institutions that encouraged broad based 
participation and placed constraints on political elites. 
• It had unusual pre-colonial political institutions allowing commoners to make suggestions 
and criticize chiefs. The institutions therefore enabled an unusual degree of participation in 
the colonial process, and placed restrictions on the political power of the elites. 
• British colonization only had a limited effect on these pre-colonial institutions because of 
the peripheral nature of the British Empire. 
• Upon independence, there were on civil wars or intense infighting to control the revenues 
from diamonds across different tribes or groups for control of the state apparatus. 
Finally, the post-independence political leaders took a number of sensible and investors 
friendly decisions.  
Mauritius 
When Mauritius became independent in 1968, external observers predicted that the country 
would experience poor economic performance because of its high population density, reliance on 
a single crop, and ethnic divisions. When it comes to success in African region, few countries can 
top Mauritius. Despite its remote location, small size, and ethnic problems, the Indian Ocean 
country has prospered compared with most other African nations. The 720,000 square-mile is an 
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African success story borne out in various rankings; first among Sub-Saharan nations in the Rule 
of Law index from World Governance indicators; first in the Index of African Governance; and 
the highest ranking African nation in the United Nations’ Human Development Index (and No. 
81 out of 182 countries worldwide). 44  Between 1970 and 2010, its gross domestic product 
averaged 5.4 percent annual growth, compared with the African average of about 1 percent.45 
Mauritius consolidate its leading position in the region this year, benefiting from relatively strong 
and transparent public institution, clear property rights, strong judicial independence and efficient 
government. The Island was able to adapt (to external shocks) with business-friendly policies that 
allowed its economy to continue to diversify and thrive. This accomplishment suggests at least 
three possible lesions for the rest of Africa. 
• First, trade is crucial to growth. 
• Second, ethnic difference can be accommodated by a well- designed parliamentary 
political system. 
• Thirdly, democracies can reform economic system in ways that foster economic growth. 
South Africa 
Though South Africa achieved independence from Britain on 31 May, 1910, Freedom day is the 
official Independence Day of South Africa. It is celebrated on 27th of April every year and 
commemorates the first democratic, non-racial elections held in 1994. South Africa is one of the 
African countries (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) that gained their 
independence only after waging war against their colonial masters. South Africa is a multi-ethnic 
                                                          
44 See World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report 2014-15 
45 See comprehensive survey of the evidence in Jeffrey Frankel (2014), Mauritius: African Success Story (NBER 
Working Paper No. 16569). 
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society encompassing a wide of variety of cultures, languages, and religious. Its pluralistic make 
up is reflected in the constitutions, recognition of 11 official languages, which is among the 
highest numbers of any country in the world (South Africa Fast Facts, 2007). 
In South Africa there was large scale European migration, the exploitative structure of the 
colonial economy was very evident. In the apartheid regime of South Africa, no African was 
allowed to own property or start a business in the European part of the economy. It is not 
surprising that black Africans were uneducated; the South African state not only removed the 
possibility of Africans benefiting economically from education, but also refused to invest in black 
schools and discouraged black education.   
Despite the difficult era of apartheid in South Africa, the post-apartheid period has been more 
successful for the country. South Africa has a mixed economy, the second largest in Africa after 
Nigeria. It also has a relatively high GDP per capita compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa ($11, 750 at PPP as of 2012).46  There have been four post-apartheid presidents in South 
Africa but the regime of Nelson Mandela, took a number sensible decisions. 
• Mandela professed himself to be humble agent acting on behalf of South Africa. His style of 
leadership allowed a participatory democracy to take root in South Africa. 
• South Africa’s emphasis on civic nationalism, equality, and democracy has afforded greater 
opportunity for peace, political stability, and economic success. 
• Despite South Africa’s rising crime levels and recent experience with, Xenophobia, it is 
undisputable that South Africa remains one of the continent’s most successful democratic 
post-colonies. 
                                                          
46 Human Development Report (2007-2008). 
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• South Africa’s constitution limits presidents to two-five year terms. Participatory democracy 
remains South Africa’s strongest asset in ensuring a strong political voice for the country. 
Sierra-Leone 
After achieving independence from Britain in 1961, Sierra-Leone enjoyed only a brief period of 
free and competitive democracy. Increasing political instability, worsening governance and 
deepening poverty marked the subsequent few decades, which terminated in institutional collapse 
and civil war.47 The country was ruled by authoritarian leaders who enriched themselves through 
illicit deals involving diamonds. The government of President Isiaka Stevens dismantled 
competitive democracy and declaring the country a one party state in 1978. By early 1990’s, 
Sierra Leone had the second lowest living standards of any country in the world (United Nations 
1993). 
The weak economic performance and poor governance of the 1970’s and 80’s steered the country 
towards civil unrest. Partially as a result of the widespread discontent towards the corruption and 
ineffectiveness of government a small group of rebels, who had entered the country from Liberia 
in 1991, were successful in recruiting disenfranchised youth to rise up violently against the status 
quo. These rebels known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) spread the armed conflict to 
all parts of the country. The brutal civil war that ensued saw an estimated 50,000 Sierra-Leoneans 
killed, over half of the population displaced from their homes, and thousands of civilians 
victimized by amputation, rape and assault (Human Rights watch 1999). A small cadre of British 
troops, along with a large international peacekeeping mission, brought the war to a decisive end 
with peace officially declared in January 2002. 
                                                          
47 Sierra-Leone had a civil war from 23rd March 1991 to 18th January 2002, between the Revolutionary United Front 
and successive governments. 
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From the foregoing analysis, there are a number of explanations why Sierra Leone does not have 
good institution after independence. 
• The British introduced a system of “Indirect Rule”, where local government administration 
was delegated to the Paramount Chiefs (PCs) who collected taxes and administer justice. 
• The Paramount chiefs (PCs) are elected for life and to be a candidate one must come from a 
ruling family or ruling house. In practice, establishing today that a particular family is a 
ruling house is done by showing that an ancestor of the house was allowed by the British to 
contest to the PC.   
• There is no formal or written list of ruling house, the set of acceptable linkage is entirely 
“local knowledge”, and the respect for the system never really be institutionalized. 
•  Sierra Leone emerged from the war in a very weak position economically, socially and 
politically. The country remained at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development 
Index ranking (183) as at 2014. 
•  Colonial rule enhance the historical legacy of inequality between local chiefs and their 
subjects. The PCs have autocratic power over their subjects, thereby exacerbating inequality 
and reinforcing social divisions.  
Togo 
Togo (although was first colonized by Germany) with French colonial history is a relatively small, 
poor West Africa country has a long post-colonial history of military rule. Togo, long time ruler 
Gnassingbe   Eyadema and his supporters, managed to block the introduction of democracy in the 
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early 1990s, after initially yielding for pressure to institute a multi-party system.48  The Togolese 
courts are also heavily influenced by the ruling regime, freedom of assembly has not been present 
and there has been extensive government control over the media.49 Togo has thus suffered a high 
degree of democracy which has resulted in long economic stagnation in the region. For instance, 
Benin and Togo are small West African neighbours, with a relatively similar ethnic 
fragmentation structure, a post-colonial history of military rule and even a shared currency (CFA). 
In terms of PPP-adjusted income, the picture of the divergence is even clearer, an average 
Beninese was 30 percent wealthier than a Togolese in 1990. In 2008 however, he or she was 77 
percent wealthier. The PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of Benin in 2008 was 1357USD, compared 
to 765USD in Togo.50 
Despite the growing interest in studying the relationship between the roles of foreign direct 
investment, institutions, output efficiency and their implications for economic growth, there has 
been little attention in economic literature with reference to Sub-Saharan African Countries. This 
thesis has tried to fill this gap by exploring various phases of the interplay between this 
relationship and their implication for the growth of Sub-Saharan African economies. 
To achieve this aim and to verify this argument, the thesis was designed to include three 
empirical chapters in addition to three other chapters; one for the introduction, a brief overview 
of Sub-Saharan Africa and the last for the conclusion. The first empirical chapter studied the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth, the second empirical chapter explored the role of 
institutional quality in determining output per worker, and the last empirical chapter studied the 
role of political and economic institutions on national efficiency.  
                                                          
48 See e.g. Bratton and Van de Walle 1997 
49 Freedom House 2008b 
50 See Knutsen (2009), Africa’s Growth Tragedy Revisited: Weak States, Strong Rulers. 
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6.1 Summary of the Findings 
The main results of this thesis can be summarised as follows. 
The first empirical chapter showed that there is a strong complementary between FDI and 
domestic capital and trade openness, which promote economic growth in SSA economies. Again 
FDI not only directly promotes economic growth by itself, but also indirectly does so via its 
interaction terms.  
The study finds FDI in SSA has served as complement to domestic firms, rather than crowding 
out domestic investment, FDI is found to be complementary with domestic investment. 
The study provides evidence to the proposition that the ability to absorb the advantages embodied 
in FDI is conditional on the capability of the host country with respect to human capital and the 
level of infrastructure. The findings confirm that certain SSA economies do not satisfy the 
threshold education and infrastructure levels and hence these countries need to invest more in 
education and infrastructure. 
The study finds that the economic nature of the host country is an important determinant of FDI 
inflows into this region. Trade openness exerts significant influence on FDI inflows. And again, 
there is a strong positive interaction effect of FDI with trade openness.   
And finally, the study cannot conclude that FDI has a different effect on mineral-rich countries 
than it does in mineral-poor countries.  
157 
 
The results obtained from the second empirical chapter provides evidence that international 
differences in output per worker are best understood using Solow model augmented with Human 
capital and Institutions. 
The study finds that aside from investment in physical capital accumulation, and human capital, 
the institutional profile exerts a strong effect in determination of output per worker in SSA 
economies. 
The study finds that government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law matters for 
determination of output per worker. But the same cannot be said of control of corruption and 
regulatory quality. 
The study finds that FDI alone exerts a positive effect on output per worker. This suggests that 
FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology. 
The study provides evidence that institutional quality in host countries is also important 
determinants outputs per worker. More importantly, workers are able to do better in the economy 
where there is a sound rule of law, less corruption, more political stability and less social tension. 
The third empirical chapter showed that in addition to purely economic indicators (e.g., Sound 
money, Government size, Trade openness, Regulations, FDI), Political institutions (Rule of law, 
Political stability, Government effectiveness, and Corruption)  play a key role in determining  
how close SSA countries are to the production  frontier. 
The study finds the level of technical efficiency across Table 5.4-5.6 presented in this section 
indicate that there is a gap from the frontier due to inefficiency that sometimes can reach to 
almost 50%. It can be concluded that Sub-Saharan Africa’s slow growth can in part be attributed 
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to a large difference among aspects of political and economic institutions in influencing technical 
efficiency. The continent is growing slowly not only because of geographic misfortune and lack 
of integration with the global but also due to the prevalence of malfunctioning institutions. 
The study finds that Human capital (education) has enhanced efficiency in a strong and pervasive 
manner. This suggests more educated workers are able to implement advanced technologies. 
The study finds that FDI has enhanced efficiency in SSA economies. This suggests that FDI is an 
important vehicle for the transfer of technology. Again the interactions’ of political variables with 
FDI reduce inefficiency. 
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6.2: Limitation of the Study 
Though the results are quite plausible and meaningful, the study is quite conscious of the data 
limitations in Sub-Saharan African countries and the need for further work in this area. 
At various stages, the basic objective of the study is suffered due to inadequacy of time series 
data from related agencies. There has been a problem of sufficient homogenous data from 
different sources. 
 For the first empirical chapter (chapter One), future studies should delve into sector specific 
effects of FDI (Natural resources, Manufacturing and Services) this will assist policy makers in 
the direction of FDI require. 
Disaggregated FDI data will permit research that estimates FDI effectiveness by sector. This will 
equip governments with the information necessary to establish policies that channel FDI to 
appropriate sectors of the economies. The World Bank and United Nations should do more to 
improve the data availability in SSA. 
In the second empirical chapter (chapter Four), we observed an important issue that most 
countries in the region do not have comprehensive data as other region in the Penn World Table 
use for our analysis. 
Again, the table has long been a data source, widely used to compare output growth and living 
standards across countries. Yet the data have also come under criticism. The new versions of the 
tables can sometimes radically change the rankings of country growth and overturn the existing 
results in the literature. 
160 
 
For, the third empirical chapter (chapter 5), the Economic Freedom of the World Indicators have 
been reported every five years and some countries again in SSA have missing values. Seychelles, 
which is a country in our sample, was not reported. 
Finally, future studies should endeavour to look for other variables that can still be crucial to 
technical inefficiency in SSA. 
6.3: Policy Implications 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from the analysis and findings of the thesis. 
Policy makers should, invest more in the development of infrastructural facilities and the road 
network that can link all this country together and regulate the inflows of foreign direct 
investment.  
 Policy focus should be directed at attracting FDI in those sectors that can lead to long-run 
economic growth, in particular the manufacturing sector. Government must target at attracting 
specific types of FDI that are able to generate spillover effects in the overall economy.  
Specific policy aimed at promoting human capital development through higher secondary school 
enrolment should be designed in a bid to spur rapid economic growth in the long-run. Sub-
Saharan Africa has one of the world’s lowest adult literacy rates, with only 60% of the population 
of 15 and over able to read and to write in 2000, well below the world average of 80%. The 
figure was below 40% in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger 
and Senegal. 
Employment by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) is one of the most effective ways by which 
FDI can reduce poverty and improves economic growth in host countries. MNC employment 
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increases domestic employment, boosts domestic wages, enhances the productivity of the labour 
force and it fosters the transfer of technology between foreign and domestic firms. Again MNCs 
pays higher wages than domestic firms and the presence of multinationals generate wage 
spillover: wages tend to be higher in industries and provinces that have a greater foreign presence 
(Asiedu, 2013). The government should ensure that more labour force is gainfully employed in 
MNCs. 
The recent pattern of FDI flows to SSA countries has been towards the oil sector, this sector is 
often an enclave sector with little backward and inward linkages with other sector. The 
economies could benefit by attracting more FDI in high technology industries. 
SSA countries should have regional economic cooperation; this may facilitate FDI to the region. 
The market size advantage of regionalism is particularly important for Africa because countries 
in the region are small in terms of income. With regards to income, about half of the country has 
a GDP of less than $3 Billion. Indeed, the total GDP of SSA in 2009 was $956 billion, which was 
about equal to the GDP of Mexico and about 61% of GDP of Brazil (WDI, 2011). 
Policies should be designed to open up their economies to trade, in order to boost the stock of 
R&D, via the increase in access to foreign capital. Trade openness, not only promotes a more 
efficient allocation of resources, but also opens the door to technological diffusion from abroad, 
and undermines local monopolies. A small number of Sub-Saharan economies adopted open 
trade (Botswana, Mauritius, and Swaziland, among others) by the early 1970s. These economies 
have out-performed the rest of Africa by a wide margin. More recently, other economies from 
West Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Mali, and a host of others) have begun to liberalize 
trade and reorient towards export-led growth. 
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Efforts should be directed at improving good governance and minimizing, if not eliminating, 
corruption and other forms of inefficiencies within the public sector so that the negative effects of 
excessive government spending on long-run growth would be reduced. Countries in SSA should 
take a cue from Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and a host of others that have set up agencies to 
fight corruption such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commissions (ICPC), which is a step in the right direction to 
improve efficiency. 
SSA countries, should pay more attention to exporting of their natural resources and agricultural 
products, this is not to suggest that they should not pay attention to industrialization. Exporting is 
associated with static gains that include access to large outside markets, hence exploiting 
economies of scale. There are also dynamic gains that include efficiency advances as a result of 
knowledge and technological spillovers from exporting experience.. Exporting is also associated 
with efficiency in resource allocation, employment generation, and relaxing of the foreign 
exchange constraints. 
Again, reforms in these economies should therefore attempt to improve the political and 
economic institutions, which are the key determinants of the technical frontier. 
Finally, the health deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be addressed through a combination of 
enhanced social policies (e.g. improved primary health care and education for rural Africans), as 
well as increased scientific efforts to control or eradicate major tropical diseases such as malaria 
and the recent EBOLA outbreak  in the region. All these worsened efficiency and lowers output 
per worker. 
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